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Abstract 
Advances in computing and mathematical techniques have given rise to 
increasingly complex models employed in the management of risk across numerous 
disciplines. While current military doctrine embraces sound practices for identifying, 
communicating, and mitigating risk, the complex nature of modern operational 
environments prevents the enumeration of risk factors and consequences necessary to 
leverage anything beyond rudimentary risk models. Efforts to model military operational 
risk in quantitative terms are stymied by the interaction of incomplete, inadequate, and 
unreliable knowledge. 
 
Specifically, it is evident that joint and inter-Service literature on risk are 
inconsistent, ill-defined, and prescribe imprecise approaches to codifying risk. Notably, the 
near-ubiquitous use of risk matrices (along with other qualitative methods), are 
demonstrably problematic at best, and downright harmful at worst, due to 
misunderstanding and misapplication of their quantitative implications. The use of fuzzy 
set theory is proposed to overcome the pervasive ambiguity of risk modeling encountered 
by today’s operational planners. Fuzzy logic is adept at addressing the problems caused by 
imperfect and imprecise knowledge, entangled causal relationships, and the linguistic input 
of expert opinion. To this end, a fuzzy inference system is constructed for the purpose of 
risk appraisal in military operational planning. 
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FUZZY INFERENCE SYSTEMS FOR RISK APPRAISAL 
IN MILITARY OPERATIONAL PLANNING 
 
I.  Introduction 
“The art of war deals with living and with moral forces. Consequently, … 
it must always leave a margin for uncertainty, in the greatest things as much 
as in the smallest. […] Mathematical factors never find a firm basis in 
military calculations. From the very start there is an interplay of 
possibilities, probabilities, good luck and bad that weaves its way 
throughout the length and breadth of the tapestry.” 
 
- Carl von Clausewitz 
On War (1832, 86) 
 
1.1 General Issue 
Clausewitz’s seminal work on the theory of war certainly does not advocate for the 
wholesale abandonment of empirical method in military planning and decision-making. 
Rather, he suggests that while it is “quite clear how greatly the objective nature of war 
makes it a matter of assessing probabilities,” it is precisely the confluence of this 
uncertainty with the element of chance, derived predominantly from the human element, 
that defines the subjective nature of war and that makes its conduct, relative to any other 
human activity, a gamble (Clausewitz, 85). It is prudent that military strategists and 
policymakers employ various methods to quantify the odds, risks, and opportunities of this 
deadly gamble. Nevertheless, the reader is cautioned that quantitative analysis should not 
direct the dogmatic application of prescriptive formulation; the complexity and constant 
change inherent to war prohibit this. Instead, rigorously applied principles are 
“indispensable to… the theory of war that leads to positive doctrine; for in these doctrines 
the truth can express itself only in such compressed forms” (Clausewitz, 152). 
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The violence and politics that Clausewitz observed on Napoleonic battlefields is no 
less central to modern conflict, but technology and globalization have since facilitated the 
natural extension of warfare into the domains of cyberspace, extra-atmospheric space, and 
perception space; each of these domains possessing unique and increasingly diverse means 
of waging combat. This nonlinear and multi-dimensional battlespace obfuscates the coup 
d’oeil, or acuity for innate truth, of even the most gifted commanders, who were once 
advised to “familiarize himself only with those activities that empty themselves into the 
great ocean of war” (Clausewitz, 144). In keeping with this analogy, the rivers discharging 
into today’s ocean of warfare are vast in number, each fed by a multitude of tributaries 
riddled with unique hazards perceptible only to experienced helmsmen. Correspondingly, 
commanders are progressively dependent on the informed analysis and communication of 
risk by expert subordinate staff who must fine-tune their senses to pierce the veil of 
Clausewitzian fog that obscures their specific risk domains. Opportunities to further inform 
military planning processes also exists in the prevalence of data and the promise of machine 
learning, driven by the increasing digitalization of maneuver forces and command and 
control systems.   
1.2 Problem Statement 
Advances in computing and mathematical techniques have given rise to 
increasingly complex models employed in the management of risk across numerous 
disciplines. While current military doctrine embraces sound practices for identifying, 
communicating, and mitigating risk, the nature of modern operational environments 
frustrates the enumeration of risk factors and consequences necessary to leverage anything 
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beyond rudimentary risk models. Efforts to model military operational risk in quantitative 
terms are stymied by the interaction of incomplete, inadequate, and unreliable knowledge. 
Recognizing the limitations of strict mathematical formulation in evaluating risk, current 
Department of Defense (DoD) and Service literature are necessarily vague in advocating 
for the use of numerical techniques, instead insisting on the primacy of qualitative 
assessments utilizing a common lexicon of linguistic categorization. Inflexibly dependent 
on the persistent input of expert opinion, such methodologies are inherently plodding and 
unresponsive to reformulation, are vulnerable to inconsistency in subjective judgment, and 
disallow the comprehensive assessment of risk under meaningful singleton values for the 
purpose of course of action comparison. 
1.3 Research Objective 
It is the objective of this thesis to begin the development of a viable method for the 
quantitative assessment of military operational risk in joint planning.  
1.4 Investigative Questions 
Oriented on the research objective, four investigative questions (IQ) are employed 
to structure the direction and content of the research.  
IQ1. How is operational risk addressed in current joint and Service literature? 
IQ2. What challenges are presented by the current doctrinal means of quantitative 
risk evaluation?   
IQ3. What are the characteristics of fuzzy logic that suggest its ability to reconcile 
quantitative risk evaluation with its inherent challenges? 
4 
IQ4. Is the proposed model, a fuzzy inference system, suitable for the quantification 
of risk within the current military planning and risk frameworks?  
Each IQ is independently examined in the subsequent chapters. Chapter II addresses the 
first three in sequence: IQ1 in Section 2.2, IQ2 in Section 2.3, and IQ3 in Section 2.4. 
Chapter III illustrates the model’s development and relationship to current planning 
practices. Chapter IV presents the practical results of an example scenario. Taken together, 
these latter two chapters support the analysis of IQ4. Chapter V formally presents the 
summary answers to all of the thesis’ investigative questions. 
1.5 Methodology 
The use of fuzzy set theory is proposed to overcome the pervasive ambiguity of risk 
modeling encountered by today’s operational planners. Fuzzy logic is adept at addressing 
the problems caused by imperfect and imprecise knowledge, entangled causal 
relationships, and the linguistic input of expert opinion (Shang, 3). Specifically, a fuzzy 
inference system is introduced that capitalizes on the current construct of the Joint Planning 
Process’ (JPP) information requirements to inform model construction as a natural 
byproduct of planning and that subordinates itself as the quantitative engine of the Joint 
Risk Analysis Methodology (JRAM). Fuzzy inference systems encode functional expertise 
through a logical rule base that manipulates linguistic variables and ambiguous 
categorizations, ultimately producing an actionable and discrete output. As the JPP and 
JRAM are largely mimicked by the individual Service doctrines, the proposed 
methodology is generalized for use across the DoD and for operational risk assessments at 
the strategic, operational, or tactical level. 
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1.6 Assumptions and Limitations 
By definition, fuzzy inference systems emulate human deductive reasoning through 
the establishment of a logical rule base encoded from expert opinion (Kosko, 25). 
Furthermore, an inference model’s linguistic variables (including the shapes and quantities 
of their corresponding membership functions) are reliant on an extensive knowledge base 
predicated on available experience data or, again, subject matter expertise. Therefore, the 
ability to formulate a fuzzy inference system is heavily dependent on the existence and 
input of expert opinion. This dictates the assumption that the risk analyst have 
unconstrained access to necessary expertise during a model’s construction. 
Secondly, a primary advantage in using a fuzzy approach lies in its ability to deal 
with imprecision and ambiguity. In the context of military operational risk, other 
deterministic or probabilistic methods may involve arrogant prescriptions resulting in 
overly precise, but less accurate, results. Alternatively, fuzzy systems exchange precision 
for accuracy; they do not guarantee optimality even under conditions of omniscience. 
Rather, the degree of constituent set fuzziness correlates with the model’s range of 
precision; it is assumed that this level of precision is sufficient and that the solution thus 
derived is acceptably accurate. This effect may be more readily recognized when output 
risk levels are defined in concrete terms like cost or casualty rate, as opposed to a generic 
‘risk level.’  
With regard to this preceding concern, it is certainly possible for fuzzy output 
variables to be defined in explicit and tactile terms. However, this thesis assumes that the 
model is predominantly utilized in comparative processes (for instance, course of action 
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comparison in operational planning). The meaning of a risk value must be assessed relative 
to other risk values generated by the same model; comparing results from dissimilar models 
may encourage inconsistent risk decisions. This is not to suggest a paramount rigidity in 
application; fuzzy inference systems are flexible and easily accept modifications based on 
the emergence of new data or change to expert opinion. Indeed, better informed models are 
likely to have more accurate resolution. However, given a change to a model, all considered 
alternatives would require reassessment. 
While trivial instances of fuzzy inference systems may be evaluated manually, the 
volume of calculation necessitates the use of computer-based models in any practical 
scenario. A number of commercial tools are available for building and evaluating fuzzy 
control and fuzzy inference systems. While not available to most military staffs at present, 
it is assumed that the risk analyst has access to software or a programming language that 
facilitates the implementation of fuzzy models. This thesis employs MATLAB’s Fuzzy 
Logic Toolbox in the construction and analysis of the example scenario presented in 
Chapter IV. 
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1.7 Preview 
This research is structured in four succeeding chapters. Chapter II, Literature 
Review, examines three dominant themes. First, military operational risk is defined and 
explored in a general sense, but also from the joint and Service perspectives. In answering 
IQ1, this Section illuminates several doctrinal deficiencies; conspicuously, the combined 
literature is inconsistent in the representation of risk and reluctant to endorse quantitative 
practices beyond vague equivocations. Secondly, and addressing IQ2, several concerns 
with risk matrices are addressed, both as a conceptual framework for understanding risk 
and as the principal means of conveyance and visualization in military parlance. Third, the 
chapter presents an elementary but thorough introduction to fuzzy set theory and the 
mathematical principles necessary for the model’s execution. This portrayal of fuzzy logic 
is expectedly indicative of its utility as a method for dealing with insufficient and imprecise 
data, a critical aspect of the challenge posed by IQ3. Chapter III, Methodology, presents a 
detailed description of the proposed model in two phases. The first phase, knowledge 
elicitation, informs the model’s construction as a parallel procedure to the JPP. The second 
phase, execution of the inference engine, applies the mathematical principles introduced in 
Chapter II to the constructed model to obtain a quantitative output and visual 
representation. Chapter IV, Analysis, demonstrates use of the model through the fictional 
scenario of a tactical rotary wing mission. This chapter illustrates a practical use of the 
methodology and suggests at its suitability, in response to IQ4, as a model for risk appraisal 
and decision-making. Finally, Chapter V, Conclusion and Recommendations, summarizes 
the research and suggests its significance, its potential for use, and areas for future research. 
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II. Literature Review 
“Even in reasoning upon some subjects, it is a mistake to aim at an 
unattainable precision. It is better to be vaguely right then exactly wrong.”1 
 
- Carveth Read 
Logic, Deductive and Inductive (1898, 351) 
2.1 Chapter Overview 
The purpose of the chapter is threefold. Sections 2.2 through 2.2.2 examine some 
historical notions of risk and attempts at quantification, but primarily serve as a brief survey 
of the current doctrine of the US Department of Defense and its subordinate Services as it 
pertains to risk assessment and management. Section 2.3 presents a criticism of commonly 
practiced qualitative methodologies; several latent complications introduced by the 
military’s prosaic use of risk matrices are discussed. Lastly, Sections 2.4 through 2.4.3 
provide a primer on fuzzy logic, its basic set theory, membership functions, and operations 
on fuzzy sets. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Read, Carveth. (1920). Logic, Deductive and Inductive, 4th Ed. London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, 
Kent & Co. Ltd. The latter half of this quote is often misattributed to John Maynard Keynes. The famous 
economist’s father, John Neville Keynes, published Studies and Exercises in Formal Logic (1884) in 
attempt to synthesize deductive and inductive reasoning, and is cited prominently by Read. 
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2.2 Military Operational Risk 
Writing in the early part of the nineteenth century, at the culmination of the 
Napoleonic Wars and prior to the full realization of the Industrial Revolution, Clausewitz 
chronicled his insight on what was perhaps the most considerable human enterprise of the 
time, warfare. Although he identified uncertainty as a pillar of war’s “paradoxical trinity” 
(along with primordial violence and its subordination to politics), the concept of risk is not 
explicitly defined. Clausewitz’ discourse on the subject, while exhaustive, can largely be 
reduced to dependency on individual talent and luck. Contemporaneously, the decline of 
mercantilism and an emerging free-market economy provided an impetus for the 
mathematical treatment of the role of risk, as in Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations 
(1776), which questioned the utility of classical probability theory to decision-making 
based on amorphous and indeterminate informational constructs (Smith, 1776). Much later, 
and subsequently motivating Great Depression era studies in macroeconomics, formalized 
structures for calculating probabilities in the context of risk were introduced in John 
Maynard Keynes’ A Treatise on Probability (1921), presenting a degree-of-truth 
permitting interval approach to probability theory, and Frank Knight’s Risk, Uncertainty 
and Profit (1921), which notably distinguished risk and uncertainty relative to whether the 
associated probability distribution was known.  
 Wishing to avoid a comprehensive survey of uncertainty and probability, it is 
sufficient that the desire to understand to the role of ambiguity in business, finance, and 
economics continued to stimulate the evolution of quantitative risk analysis throughout the 
twentieth century. Over time, the concepts derived from the science of economic risk were 
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adapted for use in other disciplines; the practice of risk management is virtually ubiquitous 
in all major endeavors, ranging from healthcare, technology, energy, construction, project 
management, to defense and finance, among others. Indeed, many of the current 
academically accepted formulations and definitions in risk management are those proposed 
by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework (2004), which is commonly 
referred to as the “Basel II Accord.” While predominantly concerned with monetary policy 
and the establishment of an infrastructure for managing for capital adequacy relative to risk 
exposure in international banking, Basel II pertinently segregates operational risk from the 
other risk categories of credit risk and market risk. Specifically, it defines Operational Risk 
(OR) as “the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and 
systems or from external events” (BCBS, 2004).  
While the Basel II definition of OR is equally useful in conceptualizing the risks 
inherent to organizations engaged in armed conflict, the exact approaches used to calculate 
the associated capital requirements have little utility in this regard. Nevertheless, the shared 
sources of risk definition and management practices are reflected in the close taxonomical 
resemblance of military risk with its economically-oriented counterparts. Notably, the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) on Joint Risk Analysis (2016) cites 
a white paper published by the International Risk Governance Council (IRGC), Risk 
Governance: Towards and Integrative Approach, as foundational to the Department of 
Defense’s top-level literature on risk (Renn, 2006). Similarly used to shape the DoD’s risk 
framework is the International Organization for Standardization’s (ISO) publication, Risk 
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Management – Principles and Guidelines (2009). By the same token, the very impetus for 
this thesis’ methodology was in part stimulated by a series of joint studies sponsored by 
the Casualty Actuarial Society, the Canadian Institute of Actuaries, and the Society of 
Actuaries that explore the applicability of several fuzzy logic practices for risk 
management (Shang & Hossen, 2013; Shapiro & Koissi, 2015). A related effort, but 
singularly oriented on the specific technique of fuzzy inference, was also made on behalf 
of Colombia’s central bank (Reveiz & León, 2009). 
International project management, as one of the few fields that approaches the 
broad risk exposure experienced in military campaigns, is also potentially informative to 
the assessment of military risk. The prospect of achieving commercial success in 
underdeveloped but high-demand markets has motivated individual risk practitioners to 
scrutinize the complexities of international construction ventures and the accompanying 
difficulties in identifying critical risk contributors as studied by Kerur & Marshall (2012) 
and Li  (2009), while more extensive studies have been funded by the industry at large 
(Gibson & Walewski, 2004). Certainly, it is evident that many lucrative speculations are 
fraught with the challenges posed by diverse geographic environments, poor infrastructure, 
and corrupt or ineffective governance, to name a few. Future models for military 
operational risk may increasingly parallel the risk assessment structures present in this 
activity. Closely related to this concern is the development of a suitable catalogue for 
classification of global and country-specific risk factors. Many diverse efforts have been 
made to derive the key risk indicators for loss potential in uncertain environments 
(Anderson, Hager, & Vormeland, 2016), to model nation-state instability via multivariate 
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methods (Shearer & Marvin, 2012), and finally to model the risk drivers of construction 
cost performance utilizing fuzzy decision frameworks (Baloi & Price, 2003). 
2.2.1 Risk in the Department of Defense 
The capstone of all risk literature in the DoD is Joint Risk Analysis (CJCSM 
3105.01, 2016), which has the stated purpose of establishing a “Joint Risk Analysis 
Methodology [and introducing] a common risk lexicon to promote consistency across the 
Joint Force.” While specifically oriented on supporting risk management practices at the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff level and, in particular, for use in the “Strategic Planning Construct,” 
it remains the authoritative reference on risk for the Services, Combatant Commands, joint 
activities, and certain defense agencies and is applicable “across the entire spectrum of 
their responsibilities.” The JRAM is designed to standardize a framework of risk-decision 
processes and taxonomy that institutes best practices to evaluate, manage, and 
communicate comprehensive risk. Depicted in Figure 1, the Joint Risk Framework consists 
of three components (Risk Appraisal, Risk Management, and Risk Communication) and 
four subordinate activities (Problem Framing, Risk Assessment, Risk Judgment, and Risk 
Management). The illustration shows the cyclical conduct of the four activities, each 
posing a distinct question that respectively yields, for a given problem, well-defined and 
context-specific risk conventions, the identification and weighting of threats or hazards, a 
risk profile and quantitative evaluation, and concludes with mitigation actions and risk 
decisions (JRA, B-1). 
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Figure 1. The Joint Risk Framework. 
Source: Joint Risk Analysis, B-2. 
 
 Risk, under the JRAM, is defined as the “probability and consequence of an event 
causing harm to something valued” (JRA, B-1). In this context, Problem Framing retains 
the traditionally accepted risk conventions of “likelihood (probability) of event 
occurrence” and “severity (consequence) of harm caused.” In the JRA manual, probability 
and consequence are both divided into the four categories reflected in Table 1, while 
suggesting only several pages later that a more appropriate degree of categorization be five 
(JRA, B-7). Nevertheless, the document is careful not to be overly prescriptive; it 
recognizes that probability and consequence must be tailored to the specific risk scenario. 
For instance, an assessment of ~20% chance of occurrence in certain risks, like that of an 
aircraft shootdown, dubiously warrant a ‘Highly Unlikely’ linguistic appraisal; such a high 
probability is perhaps more contextually appropriate as ‘Very Likely.’ Similarly, the 
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measure of acceptable damage to critical infrastructure may be more restrictive than to that 
of more ordinary materials; evaluation of the two against the same scale or criteria, even 
when sharing a common metric (say, in monetary terms), is likely inappropriate. The 
natural language descriptions of risks, probabilities, and consequences often convey more 
information than ascription of a single numeric value. Conversely, the imprecision of 
language is simultaneously problematic even considering context; for instance, it is a 
rhetorical exercise to ask how ‘Major’ and ‘Moderate’ consequences are distinguished. 
While the JRAM is cognizant of the susceptibility to fallacy, it offers only 
acknowledgement in consolation, not resolution. 
Table 1. JRA Probability, Consequence, and Risk Levels. 
Source: Author’s elaboration from Joint Risk Analysis, B-2, B-3, B-5, C-10. 
 
 The JRAM’s Risk Assessment activity attempts to establish the causal linkages 
between the sources of risk, their drivers, and the occurrence of the harmful event. A 
distinction is first made between threat and hazard sources; the former is an entity that 
actively intends harm, the latter is comprised of the passive potential of some condition to 
result in harm. Risk drivers are defined to be any factor that alters the risk expectation 
through manipulation of probability or consequence. The examined considerations may 
include the object, event, or idea of interest’s vulnerability to harm, its resilience from 
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harm, its importance, accessibility or exposure to the threat or hazard, as well as analysis 
of the higher-order effects of its damage or loss. The Risk Judgment activity then calculates 
the individual threat and hazard risk level as a function of that threat’s estimated probability 
and consequence, 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑃𝑃,𝐶𝐶). The JRAM does not, however, go on to define this 
functional relationship further, notably refraining from their commonly recognized 
multiplicative interaction. As a result, the visual representation of risk level is indicated on 
an ostensibly ambiguous, but intentionally continuous, contour graph; again, this is an 
apparent departure from the near-ubiquitous use of the ‘risk matrix’ in inter-Service 
literature. In this sense, Figure 2’s “Risk Contour Graph” is used an aid for subject matter 
experts and decision-makers in the subjective assignment of risk level utilizing any 
previously calculated values as bounds or approximations. 
 
Figure 2. Risk Contour Graph. 
Source: Author’s elaboration from Joint Risk Analysis, B-5. 
 
16 
The actual risk judgment is one of acceptability; an intolerable risk level either 
warrants additional constraints or the application of limited resources to mitigate the 
threat’s probability or consequence. Risk Management addresses this concern through any 
of four techniques: 
- Acceptance; an informed decision to act without mitigation, 
- Avoidance; the risky activity is abandoned altogether, 
- Reduction; mitigation strategies are employed to lower the risk, 
- Risk Transfer; shifting where, when, and to whom the risk is incurred. 
 
 Regarding Risk Communication, the JRA importantly acknowledges that any 
methodology must be conjoined with sound military judgment in addressing operational 
risk; while the JRAM attempts to establish a common system that facilitates collective risk 
communication, alternative frameworks should be utilized when situationally appropriate. 
Regardless of the model employed, effective communication is paramount; the language 
of risk should be easily understood across domains and organizations. Without specificity 
or context, the statement that a given scenario is “High” risk, for example, may breed 
confusion and ultimately result in a suboptimal risk decision. Instead, productive risk 
dialogue is contingent on tangible articulation in terms of “actual costs, options, impacts, 
and end-states” (JRA, A-4). 
 The JRA also distinguishes Strategic Risk, which is focused on impact to national 
interests, from Military Risk, which is concerned with threat to the Joint Force (Risk-to-
Force) and the ability to accomplish military objectives (Risk-to-Mission). While the force 
management and institutional risks of Risk-to-Force are beyond the scope of this thesis, 
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Risk-to-Mission contains the subsets of Operational Risk (OR) and Future Challenges 
Risk. Of interest to this paper, OR may be defined as a function of the probability and 
consequence of the current force’s failure to accomplish “current, planned, and 
contingency operations in the near-term (0-2 years) … within acceptable human, material, 
and financial costs” (JRA, C-8). Formally, Operational Risk is assessed in light of the 
military objectives called for under the current National Military Strategy (NMS); the 
principal sources for evaluation of OR are Campaign Plans, Crisis Response Execution 
Orders (EXORDs), Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) objectives, and Global 
Force Management (GFM) directives. Again, while the JRAM is specifically constructed 
for risk evaluation at a strategic level, and Operational Risk correspondingly defined, it is 
not incorrect to consider OR, in broad terms, as assessing the ability of any echelon, at any 
level of warfare, to accomplish a currently assigned military objective at acceptable cost. 
This paper subscribes to such a definition; the proposed methodology for evaluating 
military operational risk is, like the JRAM, a general framework structured within the Joint 
Planning Process but applicable across the entire spectrum of joint activities. It is notable 
that the military definition of operational risk considers only the ability to meet operational 
objectives, not the endogenous force management and institutional risks that ostensibly 
correspond to concerns of organizational effectiveness in the definition’s civil counterpart. 
 Another important distinction must also be made between military operational risk, 
environmental safety and occupational health (ESOH) risk, and technical risk, the latter of 
which is employed here as an umbrella term to describe the programmatic risk encountered 
in defense acquisition, lifecycle management, and information technologies. While each of 
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these diverse activities is subject to distinct regulatory guidance, it is necessary to highlight 
a technical risk document whose contents regularly surface not only in DoD operational 
risk literature, but are also recognized in a variety of governmental, commercial, and 
international publications. The Department of Defense Standard Practice: System Safety 
(MIL-STD-882E, 2012) institutes a Systems Engineering approach for the risk 
management of systems, equipment, and infrastructure from inception to grave. Governing 
risks in a more controlled environment, System Safety provides numerical examples of 
probability and severity criteria that are considerably less vague than those in the JRAM. 
The probabilities listed in Table 2, while appropriate for engineering applications, are 
defined over so tight a range as to have no practical utility in an operational sense. The 
same is potentially true of the dollar value or descriptive categorizations. 
Table 2. System Safety Probability, Severity, and Risk Levels. 
Source: Author’s elaboration from System Safety (MIL-STD-882E, 11, 12, 91). 
 
 System Safety is also, however, cautious in suggesting any fixed figures for 
categorical assignment and, while giving preference to quantitative data, ultimately 
demands compliance with the qualitative descriptions in the absence of frequency or rate 
data (MIL-STD-882E, 12). Several additional observations may be made from Table 2 that 
distinguish it from the JRAM. First, it prescribes six probability categories (the category 
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for ‘Eliminated’ is not shown) and only four for Severity and Risk Level. Second, risk is 
an expectation; it is the product of probability and severity. Lastly, the actual language used 
in defining the categories is different and those linguistic categories do not retain the same 
meaning from those in the JRAM. This is particularly true as the transformation from 
probability and severity to risk level is defined by a discretely categorized risk matrix (with 
compulsory compliance), as opposed to the continuous categorization of the JRAM’s risk 
contour graph. Without understanding these important distinctions, the errant application 
of this technical risk document by maneuver forces in operational planning is both faulty 
and dangerous. 
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2.2.2 Risk in the Uniformed Services 
Perhaps tellingly, the conceptual interpretation of risk within the DoD’s component 
Uniformed Service literature is presented in a manner more closely resembling that of 
System Safety than of Joint Risk Analysis. The Service policies respecting operational risk 
are contained in Army Techniques Publication 5-19: Risk Management (2014), Marine 
Corps Order 3500.27C: Risk Management (2014), Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 
3500.39C: Operations Risk Management (2010), and Air Force Instruction 90-802: Risk 
Management (2017). Largely homogenous in content, these documents borrow from each 
other extensively to the point of using the exact language of several key doctrinal features. 
The literature almost2 universally acknowledges four foundational risk management (RM) 
principles: 
- Integrate RM into all Phases of Missions and Operations, 
 
- Make Risk Decisions at the Appropriate Level, 
 
- Accept no Unnecessary Risk, 
 
- Apply RM Cyclically and Continuously. 
 
There also exists a generally accepted formulation for the actual systematic procedure of 
risk management as a cyclical and continuous five-step process, fundamentally 
corresponding to that of the JRAM: 
- Identify the Hazards, 
 
- Assess the Hazards, 
 
- Develop Controls and Make Risk Decisions, 
                                                 
2 The Navy consolidates the “Integrate…” and “Apply…” principles into a single bullet and adds the 
additional principle of “Accept Risk when Benefits outweigh the Cost” (OPNAVINST 3500.39C, 2). 
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- Implement Controls, 
 
- Supervise and Evaluate. 
 
While these similarities ostensibly suggest consistency in the body of Service 
literature, while still disparate from the Joint publication, there are notable inconsistencies 
in the precise taxonomies and methodological frameworks within the first two steps: 
Identification and Assessment of hazards. Together, these two elements of RM are 
considered semantically equivalent to the component of Risk Appraisal within the context 
of the JRAM; again, the JRAM’s articulation of risk level is made through use of the 
contour graph.  
 
Figure 3. Navy Risk Assessment Matrix. 
Source: ORM (OPNAVINST 3500.39C), 10. 
Herein lies an important distinction; not only do the various Service frameworks 
employ risk matrices as the primary instrument for the contextualization and translation of 
hazards to resultant risk levels (as opposed to use of the risk contour), but the Service 
representations of the risk matrix are dissimilar. For example, Figure 3 depicts the “Basic 
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Risk Assessment Matrix” as described by the Navy. Meanwhile, the standard risk matrices 
suggested by the other Services may use contrasting linguistic terms for categorical 
discrimination, or, even more noticeable, use a different number of probability, severity, 
and risk level categories altogether. The result is that the topology of the risk matrix is 
unique to the particular Service; that is, implying that the functional relationship existing 
between probability and severity is also unique to the particular Service. Consider Figure 
4, the Air Force’s “Sample Risk Assessment Matrix.” 
 
Figure 4. Air Force Risk Assessment Matrix. 
Source: RM Guidelines and Tools (AFPAM 90-803, 26). 
 The obvious differences between Figure 3 and Figure 4 are the Air Force’s addition 
of an additional probability category, the removal of a risk assessment level, application of 
naming conventions to the severity categories, and, most significantly, a wholesale 
restructuring of the mapping’s translational associations from the Navy’s symmetrical-
about-the-diagonal matrix (which is not necessarily more ‘right’). Were isocontour lines to 
be superimposed over the two figures, it is clear that they would not correspond. In the 
latter instance, the implication of the isocontour shape is that the Air Force considers an 
23 
increase in event probability to yield a lower risk than an equivalent increase in event 
severity. While such a statement may be appropriate in contextually specific scenarios, it 
is meritless in a general sense, and even particularly dangerous without specification of the 
numerical ranges under consideration (dangerous in that blind application of the format 
may result in harmful risk decisions). Furthermore, the language employed between the 
two risk matrices is not uniform and renders incommensurable any linguistic comparison. 
For instance, the Navy’s highest probability is termed “Likely,” while the same term is 
used for the second highest probability category in the Air Force’s matrix. More concerning 
is the Navy’s use of “Critical” as the highest risk level; the Air Force labels the second 
highest severity category with this word. In the realm of operational risk, where descriptive 
and qualitative measures are favored for their ability to deal in imprecision, it is evident 
that the imprecision of language has the potential to convolute inter-Service risk 
communication. 
Finally, it is important to note that neither of the discussed risk matrices are 
incontestably prescriptive. The Air Force cautions that the presented risk matrix is merely 
an example and states that “risk assessment matrices can take different forms and should 
be designed to fit the organization and/or situation as warranted” (AFPAM 90-803, 26). In 
a similar vein, the Army’s publication concedes that 
“…while mathematics and analytical tools are helpful, Soldiers always 
need to apply sound judgment. Technical competency, operational 
experience, and lessons learned weigh higher than any set of alphanumeric 
codes.” 
- Risk Management 
ATP 5-19 (2014, 1-14) 
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2.3 The Problem with Risk Matrices 
 One, if not the singularly foremost, reason for the adoption of risk matrices in the 
management of risk is in its simplicity of use, a simplicity that enables its non-technical 
employment while simultaneously giving the appearance of the same mathematical rigor 
and validity intrinsic to strict quantitative methods. Regrettably, the same simplicity belies 
a treacherous truth; as a qualitative method, risk matrices enjoy, at best, a tenuous purchase 
on their mathematical underpinnings. It must first be understood that most risk matrices 
assume a multiplicative relationship within the severity and consequence doublet; this 
multiplication is, more properly, the formula for expected risk. Mathematical expectation 
captures two desirable properties that make it a meaningful function in the context of risk. 
First, it trivializes resultant risk when either of the two contributing factors possess a null 
value. Second, it is monotonic; multiplication results in strictly non-decreasing risk 
outcomes over any range of nonnegative real severities and consequences. However, the 
use of expectation as the sole criterion in risk decision-making invites fallacy; the 
“operation literally commensurates adverse events of high consequences and low 
probabilities with… events of low consequences and high probabilities” (Haimes, 230). Of 
course, in light of Taleb’s Black Swan (2007), it is understood that decision-makers are 
more often concerned with catastrophic extremes of the former than the humdrum of the 
latter.  
 Risk matrices, as qualitative endeavors, also suffer from an inability to satisfy the 
assumptions necessary for axiomatic application. Their use of expectation assumes they 
uphold monotonicity; instead of quantitative values, the qualitative risk rankings are 
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assumed to be both non-decreasing and ordinal. Second, it is assumed that their inferential 
judgments are sound; quantitatively higher risks should be assigned qualitatively higher 
risk rankings. However, Cox, Babayev, & Huber (2005) theorize that no “direct qualitative 
rating system satisfying monotonicity is sound for arbitrary quantitative risk functions,” to 
include the multiplicative case (654). To illustrate this point, consider the basic risk matrix 
shown in Figure 5 and the three circles (cyan, 1; pink, 2; blue, 3; and brown, 4) representing 
singleton valued quantitative risk expectations calculated as the product of probability and 
severity. Suppose that severity is scaled over a broad range and that probability is narrowly 
defined. In such a scenario, it is possible to identify quantitative values of (blue, 3) that 
exceed that of (cyan, 1), despite the latter assignment of a qualitative ‘High’ to the former’s 
‘Medium.’ 
 
Figure 5. Common Fallacies of Risk Matrices. 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the concepts of Cox (2008). 
 This phenomena of rank reversal is demonstrated with the following numerical 
example. Let probability be defined from 0% to 3%, uniformly distributed, and let severity 
be defined from $0 to $3M, uniformly distributed, then 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 × 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃, 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐, 1) =  0.021 × $1,000,001 = $21,000.02, 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆, 3) = 0.019 × $2,999,999 = $56,999.98, 
(1) 
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and therefore (blue, 3) clearly is higher quantitatively than (cyan, 1), but is assigned a lower 
qualitative rank. A second phenomena is that of range compression, in which the poor 
resolution provided by the few number of categorical rankings permits assignment of 
identical qualitative rankings to quantitatively disparate risks. In this manner, Figure 5 fails 
to distinguish between (pink, 2) and (brown, 4); assuming that (brown, 4)’s probability is 
asymptotically zero, however, renders (pink, 2)’s quantitative risk orders of magnitude 
larger, despite having the same ranking. The result is uninformative categorization and 
inadequate risk management decisions wherein resources cannot be optimally apportioned 
according to ordinal ranking (Cox [2], 497). 
A third and final phenomena is that risk matrices are error prone due to discretely 
delineated categorical boundaries. In short, the true cardinality of quantitative evaluations 
are obscured for the sake of qualitative ordinality. Regardless of how proximal an 
expectation is to the nearest boundary, it is assigned exclusive categorization in only one 
ranking. In Figure 5, assuming that (cyan, 1) is firmly planted in the lower-left corner of 
its quadrant and that (pink, 2) is in the upper-right corner of its own, then the distance 
between the two expectations may be infinitesimal so long as it is crosses the boundary. 
While such an occurrence is problematic in the case of a single category, this example 
bypasses a category altogether, effectively jumping from ‘Low’ to ‘High.’ The failure of 
the risk matrix to approximate continuous functions is therefore a failure to generalize by 
induction; uniformly small perturbations potentially produce heterogeneous responses.3 
                                                 
3 This is contradictory to eighteenth-century empiricist David Hume’s proposition “that other objects, 
which are, in appearance, similar, will be attended with similar effects.” 
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The famous pipe. How people reproached me for it! And yet, could you stuff 
my pipe? No, it's just a representation, is it not? So if I had written on my 
picture 'This is a pipe', I'd have been lying!4 
 
- René Magritte 
             La Trahison des Images (1929) 
2.4 Fuzzy Set Theory 
Fuzzy logic posits a multivalued set theory, as distinct from classical set theory, 
that disallows a worldview of unambiguously discrete categorization in favor of one that 
permits belonging to a particular category as a degree of truth; in other words, suggesting 
that an object or event may satisfy the conditions of set membership only in part, rather 
than fully or not at all. Even more concisely, that a set and its complement are not mutually 
exclusive. Whereas games of chance have definitively distinguishable outcomes and, 
correspondingly, clear and precise rules for winning and losing, real world problems are 
inherently noisy, uncertain, and imprecise (certainly there are no such clearly delineated 
win conditions in modern asymmetrically-waged “grey zone” conflicts). In this regard, 
“classical probability theory assumes an accuracy and precision of categorization” that is 
wholly appropriate for predicting the results of coin flips and dice rolls, but potentially 
inadequate for the modeling of many important problems (Kosko, xxii). 
                                                 
4 Torczyner, Harry. (1977). Magritte: Ideas and Images. New York: H.N. Abrams, 71. 
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Figure 6 illustrates the fundamental distinction between classical sets and fuzzy 
sets. In the former (on the left), Magritte’s famous pipe is either most certainly a pipe, or it 
is most certainly not. The boundaries of the crisp “This is a pipe” set are unambiguously 
defined; accordingly, an element, being either a pipe or not, is designated with the binary 
truth value of zero (for full exclusion) or unity (for full membership), and is consequently 
assigned membership constrained to the exhaustive set of {0,1} (Pedrycz, 4). Meanwhile, 
fuzzy sets (on the right of Figure 6) may give consideration to the somewhat paradoxical 
nature of Magritte’s pipe; as a representation of a real pipe it possesses features thereof, 
and is therefore simultaneously both a pipe and not a pipe (and a member, to a degree, of 
both sets). While such a statement is inconsistent within classical set theory, the ambiguous 
boundaries of the fuzzy “This is a pipe” set allow Magritte’s pipe ascription of a value in 
the interval [0,1], reflecting the degree to which it said to belong (Reveiz, 8). 
 
Figure 6. A Bivalent “Crisp” Set and a Multivalued “Fuzzy” Set. 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Radionovs (2014). 
 
Fuzzy logic also more closely resembles human logic than does classical 
probability theory; the techniques used to investigate fuzzy sets are as concerned with 
human psychology as they are mathematical formulations. In fact, fuzzy variables are often 
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linguistic in nature; their values being words, not numbers. Fuzziness itself is largely a 
product of the imprecision of natural language and the distillation of mental abstraction 
into verbal representation. A commonly used example to demonstrate this point is that of 
rain, wherein “there are continuous gradations between overlapping linguistic categories: 
dense fog, drizzle, light rain, heavy rain, and downpour.” Whether it is raining or not, in 
absolute terms, is an “extreme approximation” which implies that classical set theory is a 
special case of fuzzy sets (Kosko, xxii). 
In the sense that natural language allows for “a little” or “a lot” of rain, the fuzziness 
of an event describes its ambiguity, or the degree to which it occurs. This is distinct from 
the randomness derived from an event’s uncertainty of occurrence (it occurs or not) and 
answers the question of whether it is possible to “unambiguously distinguish the event from 
its opposite” (Kosko, 264). To this end, classical set theory inflexibly requires that the 
intersection of a set and its absolute complement is equal to the empty set. Bertrand 
Russell’s The Problems of Philosophy (1912, 113) summarized this second of Aristotle’s 
three traditional laws of thought, the “law of non-contradiction,” by stating that “nothing 
can both be and not be.”5 Given the set 𝐴𝐴 and its contradictory complement 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐, 
 𝐴𝐴 ∩ 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐 = ∅, (2) 
which represents the probabilistically impossible event 
 𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴 ∩ 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐) = 𝑃𝑃(∅) = 0. (3) 
                                                 
5 The first of the “laws of thought” is the law of identity, or 𝐴𝐴 = 𝐴𝐴. Bertrand Russell (1912) describes this as 
“whatever is, is.” The identity principle is not addressed in this text, except, perhaps, insofar as the extension 
of de Morgan’s laws to show the involutive nature of a set’s complement; (𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐)𝑐𝑐 = 𝐴𝐴. For Russell’s 
mathematical representations, see Whitehead, A. N. & Russell, B. (1910). Principa Mathematica. 
Cambridge: University Press.  
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However, as demonstrated by Magritte’s pipe in the discussion of Figure 6, “fuzziness 
begins when 𝐴𝐴 ∩ 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐 ≠ ∅.” That is to say that set fuzziness only exists where the law of 
non-contradiction is violated (shown in Figure 7, this is the failure of the intersection of 𝐴𝐴 
and 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐 to produce the empty set; a phenomena sometimes referred to as overlap). The third 
of the laws of thought is called the “law of excluded middle” and is defined as  
 𝐴𝐴 ∪ 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐 = 𝑿𝑿, (4) 
which represents the probabilistically definite event 
 𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴 ∪ 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑿𝑿) = 1, (5) 
wherein X denotes the sample space (or, in fuzzy logic, the “universe of discourse”). 
Bertrand Russell (1912) defines this as “everything must either be or not be.” 
 
Figure 7. Elasticity and the Laws of Non-Contradiction and Excluded Middle. 
 
The very measure of a set’s fuzziness is determined by the extent to which the union 
of a set and its complement, 𝐴𝐴 ∪ 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐, “is a subset of its own subset 𝐴𝐴 ∩ 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐” (Kosko, 265). 
To clarify this point, fuzziness can be measured by the proportion of the union of 
complementary sets occupied by their intersection, which is depicted in Figure 7 and 
correspondingly represented by the “fuzzy” boundary illustrated in Figure 9. This is 
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decidedly distinct from the proportion of the universe of discourse occupied by the 
intersection of complementary sets; fuzzy logic does not demand that the degrees of truth 
across all sets sum to unity for a specific object, effectively permitting violation of the law 
of excluded middle (represented in Figure 7 as the failure of the union of 𝐴𝐴 and 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐 to 
produce the universe, referred to as underlap). Fuzziness, then, occurs only when the laws 
of non-contradiction and excluded middle are unsatisfied as a result of “operation with 
membership values between 0 and 1,” instead of exclusively 0 and 1, which is an otherwise 
paradoxical impossibility in classical set theory (Pedrycz, 38). It is, however, and while 
beyond the scope of this thesis, necessary to exercise caution as to not conflate fuzzy logic 
with contradiction-tolerant paraconsistent logics; while seemingly dialetheic, most fuzzy 
logics maintain truth-preservation in defining logical consequence as a matter of set 
ambiguity and are susceptible to deductive explosion; in practice, however, the evaluation 
of contradictory concepts is conducted with overlapping but distinct truth-retaining sets 
that negates this concern for approximate reasoning with vague information (Coniglio et 
al., 883).6 
With respect to the matter of set ambiguity, Figure 7 also provides a visual 
illustration of elasticity; a concept that captures the essence of fuzziness as a matter of 
degree of truth. If one were to imagine the boundary containing set A as a rubber band, 
with the crisp depiction being that of the rubber band at rest, then the “slightly” and “very” 
fuzzy sets would represent forces applied to stretch the rubber band to their respective 
degrees. In this analogy, the amount of force required to sufficiently distort the rubber band 
                                                 
6 The principle of explosion suggests that any asserted contradiction permits the logical inference of any 
given proposition. The subsequent cascade of inconsistencies trivializes the notion of truth. 
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(set 𝐴𝐴) as to contain an arbitrary element (𝑥𝑥) initially existing outside of the space so 
encircled (set 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐), is inversely proportional to the element’s degree of membership to, or 
conceptual compatibility with, set 𝐴𝐴. In this regard, propositions in classical logic are 
inelastic; given the proposition that “𝑥𝑥 belongs to 𝐴𝐴,” the element 𝑥𝑥 must satisfy the 
argument’s predicate “belongs to 𝐴𝐴” in entirety, necessarily being perfectly classified as 
either true or false. Figure 7’s latter two depictions may be thought of as instances where 
the predicate is satisfied, but only in part; for instance, in the case of “slight” fuzziness, an 
element 𝑥𝑥 requiring the corresponding degree of “slight” elastic stretch for inclusion, might 
be considered to “mostly belong to 𝐴𝐴.” These linguistic, imprecise, and vague predicates 
“appear very often in normal discourse, because they are very informative; common sense 
reasoning is elastic” (Trillas, 576). 
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2.4.1 Fuzzy Set Membership 
 Lotfi Zadeh (1965, 338) defines fuzzy sets as “a class of objects with a continuum 
of grades of membership.” So defined, the fuzzy set (class) 𝐴𝐴, as a subset of the universe 
of discourse 𝑿𝑿 (whose variable 𝑥𝑥 is a numerical value associated with the discourse of 
interest), possesses the characteristic function (herein called a membership function) 𝜇𝜇𝐴𝐴(𝑥𝑥) 
which relates, and is a mapping of, all values of 𝑥𝑥 ∈ X to a real number in the interval [0,1]. 
The value of 𝜇𝜇𝐴𝐴(𝑥𝑥) at 𝑥𝑥 is the “grade of membership,” or degree of truth, of 𝑥𝑥 belonging 
to set 𝐴𝐴 (Shapiro, 10).  
 
Figure 8. Crisp Set of Objects that are Pipes. 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Shapiro (2015). 
 
 
Figure 8 and Figure 9 depict two membership functions, 𝜇𝜇𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥), representing 
both the crisp and fuzzy cases of the set “This is a pipe” which is defined by the 
psychometric scale measuring percentage in similarity of an object to a prototypical 
smoking pipe (alternatively, compatibility with the ideological concept of the pipe) (Cox, 
91). In the figures, any object compared to the ideal pipe is assigned, through its respective 
membership function, a degree of truth in the interval [0,1]. The crisp boundary illustrated 
in Figure 8 is defined by a discrete function (a degenerate univariate) in which there is an 
unambiguous discontinuity that “jumps” at the defined threshold of 60%, prior to which 
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the object is definitively not a pipe, and after which it is; accordingly, the membership 
values are constrained to the set {0,1}. 
 
Figure 9. Fuzzy Set of Objects that are Pipes. 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Shapiro (2015). 
 
 
Particular to the fuzzy example in Figure 9, any objects determined to have a 
similarity of 70% or greater are assigned a degree of truth value of 1. Likewise, any objects 
possessing a similarity of 50% or less are assigned a degree of truth value of 0. It should 
be noted that these two values, 0 and 1, respectively imply either no or full membership in 
the “This is a pipe” set. This is equivalent to membership in the crisp classical set (as there 
exists no ambiguity in belonging). The ambiguity lies the boundary region between the 
similarity percentages of 50% and 70%; the membership function is an appropriately 
continuous piecewise linear “s,” and constitutes a fuzzy set. For instance, it is trivial to 
observe, given the uniformly increasing membership function across the fuzzy range, that 
𝜇𝜇𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(60) = 0.5. In linguistic terms, this is the case where an object possessing 60% 
similarity to the ideal pipe is assigned a degree of truth classification, or membership value, 
of 0.5. 
 While Figure 9 depicts the fuzziness internal to a single fuzzy set, it is often 
necessary to represent multiple fuzzy sets on the same universe of discourse in order to 
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illustrate the ambiguity that exists between adjacent sets. Figure 10 portrays the fuzzy sets 
associated with “light,” “moderate,” and “heavy” intensities of precipitation in millimeters 
per hour as uniquely defined by the American Meteorological Society (AMS) and the 
Royal Meteorological Society (RMetS) according to their shared linguistic categorizations 
but divergent numerical descriptions.  
 
Figure 10. Fuzzy Sets of Rainfall Rates. 
 
In instances where the two organizations agree without question as to what should 
be included in a particular fuzzy set, the corresponding range of that numerically crisp 
rainfall rate is assigned a truth value of 1 (equivalently 0 when there exists no disagreement 
as to what should not be included). Nevertheless, the overlapping boundary regions are 
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indicative of fuzziness resulting from inconsistent or contradictory definitions. One could 
readily speculate that the opposing characterizations of the same phenomena is due to a 
legitimate scientific disagreement in the meteorological community, that there exists a 
contributory statistical difference in observed North American and European rainfall rates, 
or that variance is inherent in the measurement of natural occurrences. It is, however, a 
genuine consideration that the RMetS model is granularized over and above that of the 
AMS’; the categories, though identically named, are therefore compressed relative to their 
American cousins. Although ostensibly a straightforward instantiation of fuzzy sets, this 
discussion illustrates many of the real-world drivers of ambiguity, particularly when 
linguistic categories are defined by expert opinion (or cross-organizationally). 
 A close examination of Figure 10’s membership functions is also warranted. 
Certainly, given the context and available information, the trapezoidal is a credible 
candidate function (since the extreme minimum and maximum values are both well-
defined and contain the unity membership in entirety). The shapes of the overlapping 
membership functions, and in particular the negative reciprocal slopes constituting the 
fuzzy boundary regions, suggest that for a given crisp input 𝑥𝑥, the truth value for one set is 
seemingly complimentary to that of its adjacent set. This is not universally true; truth 
degrees are not obligated to sum to unity, allowing non-complementary slopes that generate 
underlap. 
 It is also necessary, especially when dealing with mathematical operations on 
linguistic variables, to consider some other characteristics of fuzzy sets. It is first important 
to distinguish that a universe of discourse 𝑿𝑿 is associated with the linguistic variable 𝑥𝑥 
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whose range defines the problem space which is subsequently decomposed into the 
individual overlapping fuzzy sets, each named with apparently self-descriptive 
terminologies appropriate to the variable’s internal semantics. This taxonomy, as well as 
the fuzzy sets the terms represent, are collectively referred to as the term set, and are 
directly used in the logical construct of the ruleset by which some fuzzy models operate 
(Cox, 89). Figure 11 portrays several additional concepts used in describing such linguistic 
models. The support of fuzzy set 𝐴𝐴 consists of all elements of 𝑿𝑿 with a nonzero degree of 
truth, 
 𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆(𝐴𝐴) = {𝑥𝑥 ∈ 𝑿𝑿|𝜇𝜇𝐴𝐴(𝑥𝑥) > 0}. (6) 
The core of fuzzy set A consists of all elements of 𝑿𝑿 that attain a membership degree of 
unity (accordingly, the core is inherently a subset of the support), 
 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆(𝐴𝐴) = {𝑥𝑥 ∈ 𝑿𝑿|𝜇𝜇𝐴𝐴(𝑥𝑥) = 1}. (7) 
Finally, an 𝛼𝛼-cut of fuzzy set 𝐴𝐴, or 𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼, consists of all elements of 𝑿𝑿 that attain a minimum 
membership degree exceeding the specified threshold 𝛼𝛼, 
 𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼 = {𝑥𝑥 ∈ 𝑿𝑿|𝜇𝜇𝐴𝐴(𝑥𝑥) ≥ 𝛼𝛼}. (8) 
It is therefore evident that the support of 𝐴𝐴 is equivalent to evaluating the 𝛼𝛼-cut at 0 and 
the core of 𝐴𝐴 is defined where 𝛼𝛼 = 1 (Pedrycz, 14). Forcibly increasing the value of the 𝛼𝛼 
raises the threshold for set admittance, effectively determining a truth value at or below 
which membership should be considered zero for that particular application (Cox, 95). 
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Figure 11. Support and 𝜶𝜶-Cuts. 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Pedrycz (17). 
 
 Two 𝛼𝛼-cuts are considered in Figure 11, 𝛼𝛼1 and 𝛼𝛼2. Since more elements are 
admitted to 𝛼𝛼-cuts with lower 𝛼𝛼 levels, it is the case that 𝛼𝛼1 is a subset of 𝛼𝛼2, or 
 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 𝛼𝛼1 > 𝛼𝛼2 𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐 𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼1 ⊂  𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼2. (9) 
In this way, “any fuzzy set can be regarded as a family of fuzzy sets” wherein a fuzzy set 
can be constructed “from a family of nested sets (assuming that they satisfy the [above 
stated] constraint of consistency)” (Pedrycz, 17). In what is called the “representation 
theorem,” any fuzzy set may therefore be decomposed into a family of subsumed 𝛼𝛼-cuts, 
𝐴𝐴 = � (𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼)
𝛼𝛼∈[0,1]
 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝜇𝜇𝐴𝐴         or, equivalently, 𝜇𝜇𝐴𝐴(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆
𝛼𝛼∈[0,1]
�𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼(𝑥𝑥)�, 
where “𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆” is the set’s supremum at the given 𝛼𝛼 level. The importance of the 
representation theorem manifests in the implementation of fuzzy rules, the governance of 
interactions between multiple fuzzy sets, and its allowance of traditional mathematical 
techniques on fuzzy problem formulations. In effect, it permits the reconstruction of a set 
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via the merger of its partial evaluations; this concept is fundamental to the aggregation of 
consequent fuzzy sets in inference systems, which will be introduced in Chapter III. 
2.4.2 Membership Function Determination  
 In the discussion of the constituent membership functions depicting the several 
categorizations of rainfall in Figure 10, it is suggested that a trapezoidal shape is intuitively 
appropriate given the specific context of the problem as well as the limited information 
available (namely the categorical boundaries as presented by the two organizations, 
weighed equally). While the piecewise linear trapezoidal and its special case, the triangular 
membership function, are frequently used in the literature due to their simplicity in 
parameter estimation and low computational complexity, there are several other commonly 
encountered parametric functions. Among these standard parametric distributions are those 
illustrated in Figure 12. However, fuzzy membership functions may in fact take on any 
form that satisfies the mapping of the concerned concept, for input values over the specified 
universe of discourse, to output values between and including 0 and 1 (Pedrycz, 8); for 
fuzzy set 𝐴𝐴, 
 𝐴𝐴:𝑿𝑿 → [0,1]. (10) 
In this sense, there exist no hard rules for the creation of membership functions, nor 
are there any “universal or pre-defined fuzzy sets;” the actual contours of a fuzzy set are 
entirely and exclusively representative of the semantic properties of the conceptual 
phenomenon in light of the model’s context and outside of which the “fuzzy set has no 
meaning” (Cox, 100).  A function’s mathematical form and parameters, and consequently 
the latent knowledge it encodes, are subject to the intuition, experience, and information 
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possessed by the formulator and their consulted decision-makers or subject matter experts. 
While nearly any shape is permissible, selection of membership functions should not be 
made arbitrarily; good models closely mimic real-world behaviors and the various classes 
of parametric distributions are often employed as adequate representations for particular 
classes of knowledge. Nevertheless, it is widely accepted that the “exact semantics 
captured by fuzzy sets is not too sensitive to variations in the shape” and are “tolerant of 
approximations” in both definition of the problem space and set representation (Pedrycz, 
9; Cox, 100). While more complex functions, or their joint use, may better represent 
membership in real-world sets and possess higher information content and fidelity, the 
insensitivity of fuzzy models makes them quite robust to selection of membership function. 
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Figure 12. Common Membership Functions. 
The parameterized functions presented in Figure 12 are generally representative of 
two encompassing types of fuzzy sets, fuzzy numbers and fuzzy qualifiers. In each depiction 
and for all nonnegative values of membership, the parameter 𝑚𝑚 is the modal value, 𝑃𝑃 is the 
lower bound, and 𝑃𝑃 is the upper bound. Triangular and bell-shaped curves, akin to Figure 
12’s triangular and Gaussian functions, are often used to represent the quantitative 
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approximation of a specific numeric value (any similarly convex distributions like some 
exponential, hyperbolic, or normal functions, among others, are contextually viable). 
Again in Figure 12, only the single-point supremum of the triangular and Gaussian 
achieves a membership degree of 1, and can consequently be considered to depict the fuzzy 
set approximating the central value 𝑚𝑚. In what are sometimes called fuzzy numbers, the 
kurtosis (or, in the triangular case, spread) of such functions may be indicative of the degree 
to which the approximation is precise (whether the approximation is accurate is a different 
question entirely)7. While bell-shaped membership functions are favored for their concise 
notation, consistent smoothness, and for maintaining nonzero values across the universe of 
discourse (since they only asymptotically approach 0), triangular distributions are often 
satisfactory surrogates due to their low information and calculational demands, especially 
in light of the aforementioned insensitivity of fuzzy systems. Nevertheless, it is informative 
to consider the properties and typical behaviors modeled by common probability 
distributions when constructing fuzzy membership functions; Law (2007, 275) presents an 
extensive treatment on probability distribution functions for simulation input. 
It is also obvious when comparing Figure 12’s membership functions that the 
triangular is identical to the trapezoidal when 𝑚𝑚 and 𝑐𝑐 are coincident. Trapezoidal or 
platykurtic bell-shaped functions are often appropriate when representing classes of 
numbers or conceptual categorizations. Many of these functions are structured with a  
                                                 
7 Kurtosis is the fourth moment about the mean of a probability distribution and is reflective of its 
“tailedness.” Platykurtic distributions have thin tails and are generally described as “fat” or “flat-topped” and 
may therefore indicate a broader, but more uniform, approximation. Leptokurtic distributions have fat tails 
and descriptively have more “peakedness,” representing a narrower but more extreme approximation (Cox, 
521). 
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plateau designating full membership over a specified numeric interval. Conversely, fuzzy 
qualifiers are used to model concepts exhibiting asymmetric, dichotomous, or unbounded 
behaviors. The sigmoidal contour in Figure 12, or any comparable “S-curve,” polynomial, 
logistic, or strictly linear representation typically attains full membership at its open-ended 
side, whether left or right, and possess a zero degree of membership on the closed side. 
These upper- and lower-bound parameters, and importantly the inflection point 𝑚𝑚, are 
selected to reflect the suspected or known distribution of the population of interest, as well 
as its underlying characteristics (Cox, 112). Specifically, S-curves regularly correspond 
with the growth curves of continuous random variables and their cumulative distribution 
functions. In this regard, they are also suitable when dealing with event frequencies, time-
series, proportional dependencies, and imprecision in conditional qualifications; however, 
fuzzy propositions “involving ‘usuality’ terms lead to a class of ultra-fuzzy implications 
[in fuzzy reasoning]” (Cox, 114). 
2.4.3 Fuzzy Set Operations 
 In order to perform mathematical operations to combine, compare, or otherwise 
aggregate fuzzy sets, it is necessary to extend propositional logic from classical bivalence 
to one of multivalued logic. Having already established that classical sets are a special case 
(equivalently, a subset) of fuzzy sets in which truth values are anchored to the extremes of 
0 (absolute exclusion) and 1 (absolute inclusion), the basic logical connectives of 
conjunction (and), disjunction (or), and negation (not) are preserved under conditions of 
multivalence. Furthermore, because membership functions are “equivalent representations 
of sets,” the mathematical operators of intersection (∩), union (∪), and complement (𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐), 
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which are in turn equivalent to the respective logical connectives, are correctly represented 
by evaluating the “minimum, maximum, and one-complement of the corresponding 
[membership] functions for all 𝑥𝑥 ∈ 𝑿𝑿:” 
 
(𝜇𝜇𝐴𝐴∩𝐵𝐵)(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑚𝑚𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐�𝜇𝜇𝐴𝐴(𝑥𝑥),𝜇𝜇𝐵𝐵(𝑥𝑥)� = 𝜇𝜇𝐴𝐴(𝑥𝑥) ∧ 𝜇𝜇𝐵𝐵(𝑥𝑥), 
(𝜇𝜇𝐴𝐴∪𝐵𝐵)(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝑥𝑥�𝜇𝜇𝐴𝐴(𝑥𝑥),𝜇𝜇𝐵𝐵(𝑥𝑥)� = 𝜇𝜇𝐴𝐴(𝑥𝑥) ∨ 𝜇𝜇𝐵𝐵(𝑥𝑥), 
𝜇𝜇𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐 (𝑥𝑥) = 1 − 𝜇𝜇𝐴𝐴(𝑥𝑥), 
(11) 
wherein A and B are defined sets in the universe of discourse 𝑿𝑿 and 𝜇𝜇𝐴𝐴∩𝐵𝐵 and 𝜇𝜇𝐴𝐴∪𝐵𝐵 are the 
membership functions resulting from A and B’s intersection and union, respectively 
(Pedrycz, 31). Use of the 𝑚𝑚𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐 (∧), 𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝑥𝑥 (∨), and additive complement (1 −) operators 
permit application of the logic to continuous sets; that is, they both satisfy preservation of 
the truth values according to bivalent logic while simultaneously allowing real numbers 
between 0 and 1 (Reveiz, 12). Utilizing the analogy and membership functions introduced 
in Figure 10, a comparison of bivalent logical operators and multivalent logical operators 
in assessing several propositional constructs is illustrated in Figure 13.  
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Figure 13. Logic Operators under Bi- and Multivalence. 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Mathworks (2018). 
 
However, the min, max, and additive complement mathematical functions do not 
provide a singularly unique definition of the logical operations in both bivalent and 
multivalent logics; while most applications of fuzzy logic adopt these operations, they 
represent only a particular correspondence between the two systems of logic. In fact, the 
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specific operations used to define fuzzy conjunctions and disjunctions are “arbitrary to a 
surprising degree,” and many alternative functions have practical use (Mathworks, 1-21). 
In general, the intersection (logical conjunction) of two fuzzy sets 𝐴𝐴 and 𝐵𝐵 is specified by 
the binary algebraic operation 𝑇𝑇, or t-norm, used to aggregate their respective membership 
functions such that for all 𝑥𝑥 ∈ 𝑿𝑿, 
 (𝜇𝜇𝐴𝐴∩𝐵𝐵)(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑇𝑇�𝜇𝜇𝐴𝐴(𝑥𝑥),𝜇𝜇𝐵𝐵(𝑥𝑥)�, (12) 
which performs the binary mapping 
 𝑇𝑇: [0,1] × [0,1] → [0,1]. (13) 
The t-norm, or triangular norm, is adopted from probabilistic metric spaces which 
requires a generalization of the triangle inequality (in geometry, that the sum length of any 
two sides of a triangle must be greater than or equal to the length of the third) of ordinary 
metric spaces subjected to probability theory, such that distances are characterized by 
probability distributions (Menger, 536). In fuzzy set theory, triangular norms form the basis 
for mathematical operations on fuzzy sets, and must satisfy the following basic properties, 
including boundary conditions such that they behave correctly as a generalization of set 
operations on crisp sets (Pedrycz, 33): 
- Commutativity: 𝑇𝑇(𝑥𝑥,𝑃𝑃) = 𝑇𝑇(𝑃𝑃, 𝑥𝑥), 
- Associativity: 𝑇𝑇(𝑥𝑥,𝑇𝑇(𝑃𝑃, 𝑧𝑧)) = 𝑇𝑇(𝑇𝑇(𝑥𝑥,𝑃𝑃), 𝑧𝑧),  
- Monotonicity: 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 𝑥𝑥 ≤ 𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 𝑤𝑤 ≤ 𝑧𝑧, 𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐 𝑇𝑇(𝑥𝑥,𝑤𝑤) ≤ 𝑇𝑇(𝑃𝑃, 𝑧𝑧), 
- Boundaries: 𝑇𝑇(0, 𝑥𝑥) = 0, 𝑇𝑇(𝑥𝑥, 1) = 𝑇𝑇(1, 𝑥𝑥) = 𝑥𝑥. 
As with logical conjunctions in classical bivalence, the commutative (indifference 
to order of membership function aggregation in conjunction) and associative properties 
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(indifference to order in pairwise conjunction of any number of membership functions) 
hold in multivalence. Likewise, monotonicity dictates, for example, that an increase in the 
truth or membership values of conjuncts is prohibitive of a decrease in the truth or 
membership value of the corresponding conjunction. Lastly, in the case of boundary 
conditions, inclusion of the identity element (1) implies the constraining extremes of 
multivalence; a truth or membership value in the bivalent set {0,1} represents false and true 
assessments, respectively. 
Correspondingly, the union (logical disjunction) of two fuzzy sets 𝐴𝐴 and 𝐵𝐵 is 
specified by the binary algebraic operation 𝑆𝑆, called the t-conorm or s-norm, used to 
aggregate their respective membership functions such that for all 𝑥𝑥 ∈ 𝑿𝑿, 
 (𝜇𝜇𝐴𝐴∪𝐵𝐵)(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑆𝑆�𝜇𝜇𝐴𝐴(𝑥𝑥),𝜇𝜇𝐵𝐵(𝑥𝑥)�, (14) 
which performs the binary mapping 
 𝑆𝑆: [0,1] × [0,1] → [0,1]. (15) 
The s-norm, or triangular co-norm, is formally the dual of the t-norm and, 
commensurate with de Morgan’s laws8, is complementary to any given t-norm 𝑇𝑇 by way 
of negation, 
 𝑆𝑆(𝑥𝑥,𝑃𝑃) = 1 − 𝑇𝑇(1 − 𝑥𝑥, 1 − 𝑃𝑃). (16) 
 
                                                 
8 de Morgan’s laws state that the complement of a union is equivalent to the intersection of complements 
where (𝐴𝐴 ∪ 𝐵𝐵)𝑐𝑐 = 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐 ∩ 𝐵𝐵𝑐𝑐 and the complement of an intersection is equivalent to the union of complements 
where (𝐴𝐴 ∩ 𝐵𝐵)𝑐𝑐 = 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐 ∪ 𝐵𝐵𝑐𝑐. Weisstein, Eric W. (2018). "de Morgan's Laws." MathWorld. 
http://mathworld.wolfram.com/deMorgansLaws.html. 
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Like their t-norm duals, s-norms must satisfy the following axiomatic properties: 
- Commutativity: 𝑆𝑆(𝑥𝑥,𝑃𝑃) = 𝑆𝑆(𝑃𝑃, 𝑥𝑥), 
- Associativity: 𝑆𝑆(𝑥𝑥, 𝑆𝑆(𝑃𝑃, 𝑧𝑧)) = 𝑆𝑆(𝑆𝑆(𝑥𝑥,𝑃𝑃), 𝑧𝑧),  
- Monotonicity: 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 𝑥𝑥 ≤ 𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 𝑤𝑤 ≤ 𝑧𝑧, 𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐 𝑆𝑆(𝑥𝑥,𝑤𝑤) ≤ 𝑆𝑆(𝑃𝑃, 𝑧𝑧), 
- Boundaries: 𝑆𝑆(𝑥𝑥, 0) = 𝑆𝑆(0, 𝑥𝑥) = 𝑥𝑥, 𝑆𝑆(𝑥𝑥, 1) = 1. 
Subject to the defining axioms, triangular norms and co-norms therefore define 
general classes of operators for assessing the intersection and union of fuzzy sets, and many 
parameterized t-norms and s-norms are common in the literature. Pedrycz and Gomide 
(1998, 33) present a substantial treatment of those most frequently encountered, as well as 
a discussion of specific features of their subclasses. While each unique mapping “provides 
a way to vary the gain on the function so that it can be very restrictive or very permissive,” 
it is evident when considering the boundary conditions established by the basic properties 
of triangular norms and their co-norms that the 𝑚𝑚𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐 (∧) and 𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝑥𝑥 (∨) operators 
respectively belong to the classes of t-norms and s-norms, and are perhaps the most 
frequently used in practice (Pedrycz, 33; Mathworks, 1-23). Not coincidentally, these 
functions are in fact those utilized by Kurt Gödel’s (1932, 65) intuitionistic multi- and 
infinitely-valued logics shown to be completely sufficient for axiomatization. Figure 14 
depicts the three dimensional and contour graphs of several common mappings, 
encapsulated by, and as an interval-constrained instance of, the Schweizer-Sklar family of 
triangular norms (1963, 69). 
The minimum t-norm, when constrained to bivalence, corresponds to the set 
intersection operator and therefore provides an upper bound on the t-norms class (whose 
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supremum is 1). Alternatively, the ordinary product is sometimes used for intersection (as 
it is with the probabilities of two independent events in probability theory; 𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴 ∩ 𝐵𝐵) =
𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴)𝑃𝑃(𝐵𝐵)), whereas the lower bound on the t-norm class is formed by the drastic product. 
Accordingly, the bounds of t-norms are defined by 
 𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐(𝑥𝑥,𝑃𝑃) ≤ 𝑇𝑇(𝑥𝑥,𝑃𝑃) ≤ 𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥,𝑃𝑃). (17) 
 
 
Figure 14. Common and Boundary Triangular Norms and Co-Norms. 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Béhounek, Libor. (2007). Public Domain.  
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Likewise, the maximum s-norm, as the dual to the minimum t-norm, constrained to 
bivalence corresponds to the set union operator and provides the lower bound on the s-
norm class (whose infimum is 0). Similar to its dual, the algebraic sum (here,𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃) is 
sometimes used for union (again, in probability theory, that 𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴 ∪ 𝐵𝐵) = 𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴) + 𝑃𝑃(𝐵𝐵) −
𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴 ∩ 𝐵𝐵)), and the lower bound on the s-norm class is formed by the drastic sum. 
Accordingly, the bounds of s-norms are defined by 
 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚(𝑥𝑥,𝑃𝑃) ≤ 𝑆𝑆(𝑥𝑥,𝑃𝑃) ≤ 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐(𝑥𝑥,𝑃𝑃). (18) 
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III. Methodology 
“It has been observed, that a weight A of 10 grams and a weight B of 11 
grams produce identical sensations, that the weight B is just as 
indistinguishable from a weight C of 12 grams, but that the weight A is 
easily distinguished from the weight C. Thus the raw results of experience 
may be expressed by the following relations: A=B, B=C, A<C, which may 
be regarded as the formula of the physical continuum.”9 
 
- Henri Poincaré 
La Science et l’Hypothèse (1902, 34) 
3.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter presents a general methodology for the quantification of military 
operational risk that coincides with the process of Risk Appraisal as defined in the DoD’s 
Joint Risk Analysis Methodology. This general methodology capitalizes on the human-
thought-like approximate reasoning afforded by fuzzy logic by way of a fuzzy inference 
system, introduced in Section 3.2. The first phase of the method, knowledge elicitation, is 
discussed in Sections 3.3.1 through 3.3.3, and navigates the process of building the model, 
particularly in the context of Joint Planning (JP 5-0) and Joint Operations (JP 3-0). Sections 
3.4.1 through 3.4.6 discuss the mathematical mechanisms of the model’s execution. 
Section 3.5 concludes the chapter and discusses use of the model’s results. For exposition, 
a small-scale example problem parallels the sequential processes examined throughout.  
                                                 
9 Poincaré, Henri. (1913). Science and Hypothesis. Trans. Halsted, George Bruce. New York: The Science 
Press. Poincaré is referring to the observations of Gustav Fechner (1801-1887), who in 1860 published 
Elemente der Psychophysik; the Weber-Fechner laws postulate the differences between actual and perceived 
physical stimuli. In essence, the inherent inaccuracy of human sensory perception in the physical continuum 
necessitates approximation that permits relative comparison, but not strict distinction, of physical 
phenomena. 
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3.2 Fuzzy Inference Methodology 
The proposed methodology for reconciling current operational risk management 
practices with their apparent deficiencies utilizes the same fundamental rule-based 
structure employed in the logic controllers of many automated devices, a process referred 
to as a fuzzy inference system (FIS), fuzzy logic inference system (FLIS), or fuzzy expert 
system (FES) (Shapiro, 17). In these processes, crisp input values are ultimately mapped 
to a crisp output space through a series of fuzzy operations independently detailed in 
Chapter II. In the specific context of military operational risk management, it is desirable 
that the input variables be metrics correlated with suitable key risk indicators (KRIs); the 
output value is an aggregate risk value used to inform risk decisions or course of action 
comparison in operational planning (Girling, 251). Illustrated in Figure 15, a FIS can be 
thought to consist of two primary structures; first, a knowledge base in which the risks, 
their indicators, and measures inform the construction of a membership function database 
and compatible logical rule base. Second, a logical processor, or “inference engine,” that 
subjects the measured (or projected) input variables to a procedure consisting of the five 
sequential subprocesses of fuzzification, composition, implication, aggregation, and 
defuzzification. While the exact architecture of the FIS presented in this document is a 
commonly practiced one, its unique application within the DoD’s existing risk framework 
warrants, for the purpose of brevity, the discrimination between it and the general case, and 
is henceforth referred to as the “Risk Appraisal Fuzzy Inference System,” or RAFIS. 
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Figure 15. Anatomy of a Fuzzy Inference System. 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Shapiro (18) and Reveiz (17). 
  
 The Joint Risk Analysis Methodology (JRAM) detailed in Chapter II describes a 
framework consisting of three fundamental pillars and four supporting activities. Of these 
components, the RAFIS methodology proposed herein is concerned primarily with Risk 
Appraisal, “the generation of knowledge and understanding,” as opposed to Risk 
Management which entails the actualization of risk decisions and implementation of 
controls (JRA, B-2). Naturally, effective Risk Communication is a persistent requirement 
throughout the risk analysis process; as an expert system, it is in the nature of any FIS to 
facilitate inter-domain conversation, particularly in the collaborative design of the logical 
rule base. Additionally, the proposed model’s knowledge elicitation process abstracts a risk 
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ontology that satisfies the JRAM’s subordinate steps of Problem Framing and Risk 
Assessment which jointly require specification of the military operation to be modeled, 
examination of its particular risks, exploration of their correlations and causal pathways, 
development of measurement criteria, and definition of a problem specific vocabulary. 
Finally, the first element of Risk Judgment is addressed through the crisp numerical output 
of the RAFIS; it is the goal of Risk Characterization to capture comparative assessments 
of the operation’s independent risk factors. While admitting that quantification and visual 
depiction are desirable when informing risk decisions, and accordingly endorsing 
mathematical expectation and the “risk [matrix] contour graph” as tools thereof, the JRAM 
concedes that it “is ultimately a qualitative effort” (JRA, B-4). 
Alternatively, the RAFIS offers a methodology that consistently provides 
quantitative valuations of risks and necessarily generates, as a byproduct of the inference 
process, ‘fuzzy risk matrices’ for the pictographic comparison of all pairwise indicators 
and their resultant risk values. The RAFIS, embedded and subordinated to the JRAM and 
as a continuously iterative parallel to the Joint Planning Process (JPP), is depicted in Figure 
16 as the motivating apparatus that energizes the wholesale risk appraisal and management 
construct; appropriate to this analogy, the Fuzzy Inference Engine is, in particular, the 
driving mechanism in the conveyance of risk knowledge, understanding, decision, and 
action. 
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Figure 16. Dynamics of the JPP, JRAM, and RAFIS. 
 
3.3 Knowledge Elicitation 
 In what is most closely synonymous with the JRAM’s Problem Framing, but also 
concerned with Risk Assessment, knowledge elicitation is the process by which the model’s 
mathematical structure is formulated and its constituent elements parameterized. As 
operational risks are, in large part, comprised of emerging threats in diverse geographic 
environments, they are expectedly subject to underdeveloped experience data. 
Consequently, expert opinion is elicited to serve as the principal evidentiary source from 
which the model’s construction is informed; in particular, the causal relationships specified 
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in the inference system’s rule base confer meaning and utility to the otherwise 
unenlightened model. It is essential that the analyst, serving as the knowledge engineer, 
exercise due diligence in facilitating elicitation; the very quality of the advising experts’ 
opinions directly translates to the model’s credibility and usefulness. In keeping with the 
JRAM, knowledge elicitation is a continuous and iterative process in which feedback 
mechanisms are established to fine-tune the system’s parameters and rules. Accordingly, 
the RAFIS capitalizes on three information vectors contemporaneously present throughout 
the JPP and illustrated in Figure 16: course of action (CoA) evaluation criteria, staff 
estimates, and operation assessment.  While risks and their indicators are not fully 
coterminous with the standards and measures established in each of these distinct veins, 
they form a repository from which the knowledge base may, in part, be extrapolated. 
CoA evaluation criteria are designed to measure a CoA’s relative effectiveness by 
distinguishing the contributory factors of mission success from those of mission failure 
(and in accordance with the commander’s planning guidance). Established prior to 
wargaming as a hedge against bias and subjectivity when testing, they are precisely defined 
and often evaluated with a numerical score by the staff member with functional area 
responsibility and weighted according to relative importance. It is plainly evident how this 
process might contribute to identifying risk factors and their indicators, bounding possible 
criterion domains, parameterizing result categories and, ultimately, through wargaming, 
provide suitable estimates for model inputs. Appendix G of JP 5-0, Joint Planning, offers 
an overview and example of CoA comparison techniques. 
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Staff estimates, meanwhile, provide a running and more highly-granulized 
assessment of a functional area’s level of mission support. Again, initial estimates are 
expected to assist in structuring the RAFIS; identification of essential resource shortfalls, 
capability limitations, or operational impediments may prove to be among the dominant 
drivers of mission risk. Subsequent updates naturally allow for model refinement, not only 
up to the point of input variable generation for the purposes of CoA comparison, but also 
in monitoring the evolution of risk as the operation proceeds in execution. With regard to 
external adversarial threats or Operational Environment (OE) hazards, it is of particular 
consequence that “critical knowledge gaps in initial estimative intelligence” and the 
validation of key planning assumptions be addressed through a comprehensive intelligence 
collection plan (JP 5-0, V-16). In many cases, the importance of the associated risks 
necessitates the establishment of Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) specific to their 
causal factors or indicators; for this reason, bilateral communication between the 
intelligence staff and the knowledge engineer is imperative. In competing for the 
prioritization of limited collection assets, the risk analyst must advocate when necessary, 
but also be critically-minded in determining the true merit of the KRI as an indicator of its 
associated risk factor. Appendix C of JP 5-0, Joint Planning, details the process of capturing 
staff estimates in the context of the JPP. 
Finally, operation assessment “refers specifically [to measuring] progress [or 
regression] towards accomplishing tasks, creating conditions or effects, and achieving 
objectives” during both planning and execution (JP 3-0, II-9). In this capacity, it utilizes 
Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) to monitor the degree of change in the OE due to an 
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operational task; Measures of Performance (MOPs) are designed to evaluate the standard 
to which the task is conducted. While staff estimates are a natural vehicle for these 
measures, operation assessment is distinctively oriented on the linkages between an action 
and its desired effect, or attainment of an end state. Indicators like MOEs and MOPs are 
judiciously selected for their ability to delineate causalities and are consequently subjected 
to a number of axiomatic efficacy gauges that are expectedly congruent with those applied 
to Key Risk Indicators. While Annex A to Appendix D of JP 5-0, Joint Planning, provides 
a satisfactory overview of operation assessment, it is the Data Collection Plan (DCP) 
discussed in Annex B that is of most interest to the knowledge engineer. The DCP institutes 
a number of additional criteria to ensure the ‘measurability’ and methods of MOP and 
MOE indicator collection; these criteria are equally applicable to KRIs (JP 5-0, D-B-1). 
3.3.1 Determine Risk Hierarchy, Risk Factors, and Key Risk Indicators 
 
𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑓𝑓: 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅 𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑓𝑓 ∈ {1, 2, … ,𝑚𝑚} 
𝒀𝒀𝑓𝑓:𝑈𝑈𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑓𝑓 
𝒚𝒚: 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓 𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃 𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅,𝒚𝒚 = (𝑃𝑃1,𝑃𝑃2,𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓 , … ,𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚) 
𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅,𝑓𝑓:𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑓𝑓 
𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑘𝑘: 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓 𝐾𝐾𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅 𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑅𝑅 ∈ {1, 2, … ,𝑐𝑐} 
𝑿𝑿𝑘𝑘: 𝑈𝑈𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐾𝐾𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑅𝑅 
𝒙𝒙: 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓 𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃 𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅,𝒙𝒙 = (𝑥𝑥1, 𝑥𝑥2, 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘 , … , 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) 
𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑅𝐾𝐾,𝑘𝑘:𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐾𝐾𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑅𝑅 
(19) 
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This first component of knowledge elicitation answers, to an extent, the “risk to 
what?” and “risk from what?” questions posed in the Problem Framing and Risk 
Assessment activities. Taken together, these two questions define the information desired 
as output from the model (to what?) and the informational demands of the model’s input 
(from what?) (Cox, 543). Whereas the JRAM incorporates the quantification of scales, 
probabilities, and consequences in these activities, the RAFIS does not. Instead, the output 
of this process is a hierarchical vocabulary of the linguistic universes, sets, and variables 
that comprise the scenario’s risk dialogue.  The “context-specific risk lens” in Figure 16 
alludes to the exacting inspection demanded of the knowledge engineer in circumstantial 
contemplation of the military operation of interest and its accordant compulsory tailoring 
of the risk framework. Specifically, the risk analyst must extricate, from the JPP’s three 
information vectors, a modeling infrastructure that is contextually considerate of the 
problem; there is no universal ontology for military operational risk. Indeed,  
“the military instrument of national power can be used in a variety of ways 
that vary in purpose, scale, risk, and combat intensity [and can be] 
understood to occur across a continuum of conflict ranging from war to 
peace” (JP 1, xi). 
 
While not prescriptive, it is useful to consider a variety of systems perspectives, or “lenses,” 
for decomposition of the OE, across the range of military operations, into a manageable 
construct. Among these are: 
 
- Operational Variables (PMESII-PT); Political, Military, Economic, Social, 
Infrastructure, Informational, Physical Environment, Time (JP 3-0, IV-3), 
 
- Mission Variables (METT-TC); Mission, Enemy, Terrain and Weather, Troops and 
Support Available, Time Available, Civil Considerations (ADRP 3-0, 1-2), 
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- ASCOPE; Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, Events (JP 5-0, 
IV-11), 
 
- Principles of Joint Operations (Principles of War); Objective, Offensive, Mass, 
Maneuver, Economy of Force, Unity of Command, Security, Surprise, Simplicity, 
Restraint, Perseverance, Legitimacy (JP 3-0, I-2), 
 
- Joint Functions (Warfighting Functions); Command and Control, Intelligence, 
Fires, Movement and Maneuver, Protection, Sustainment (JP 3-0, III-1), 
 
- Operational Environment Dimensions; Air, Land, Maritime, and Space Domains, 
the Electromagnetic Spectrum, Information Environment (including Cyberspace) 
(JP 5-0, IV-10), 
 
- (5-M); Man, Machine, Medium, Management, Mission (AFPAM 90-803, 13), 
 
- Joint Capability Requirements (DOTmLPF-P); Doctrine, Organization, Training, 
material, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, Policy (CJCSI 
5123.01H, A-8). 
 
The RAFIS is structured as a three tiered hierarchy in which the comprehensive 
Operational Risk is expanded into a set of 𝑚𝑚 subordinate Risk Factors (𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑓𝑓) that constitute, 
and are in fact synonymous with, the model’s consequent (dependent variables, 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓) 
universes of discourse (𝒀𝒀𝑓𝑓), and could take the form of “risk to…” the various elements of 
the systems perspectives enumerated in the preceding paragraph. The Risk Factors are 
further expanded into 𝑐𝑐 Key Risk Indicators (𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑘𝑘) that are either the direct determinants 
or adequately proximate indicators of the prime drivers of the Risk Factors, which 
comprise, and are likewise synonymous with, the model’s antecedent (independent 
variables, 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘) universes of discourse (𝑿𝑿𝑘𝑘). In this manner, the KRIs are representative of 
“risk from what?” Each Risk Factor and KRI are then further decomposed into term sets, 
effectively quantizing the linguistic variables into subordinate taxonomies of fuzzy sets 
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(𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅,𝑓𝑓 and 𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑅𝐾𝐾,𝑘𝑘, respectively). The number of fuzzy set ‘terms’ internal to each term 
set is an important characteristic of the model’s semantics that allows for varying degrees 
of granularity in expert judgment, but should be considered with regard to the shape and 
overlap of membership functions determined in the following elicitation step. Figure 17 
depicts the general structure of a hierarchy developed by this process.  
 
 
Figure 17. RAFIS Risk Hierarchy. 
 
While not mathematically necessary to differentiate a Risk Factor or KRI from its 
universe (for instance, 𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑘𝑘 and 𝑿𝑿𝑘𝑘), the distinction is made in the RAFIS to isolate 
linguistic variables from their quantitative descriptions. Similarly, a term set need only 
specify its linguistic elements; the fuzzy membership function defining each elemental 
term is calibrated later in the elicitation process. To clarify the outcome of this process, a 
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trivial example is introduced in which the problem of interest is adequately addressed by a 
single risk factor. It is therefore termed, simply, Risk Level, where 
 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹1 = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃. (20) 
Contributing to this Risk Factor are the two KRIs elicited from expert opinion, Probability 
and Severity, 
 𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑘𝑘 = {𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃}. (21) 
In the example, suppose that expert opinion suggests that an appropriate resolution for 
quantizing Risk, Probability, and Severity is by three categories each. The term sets are, 
respectively, 
 
𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅,1 = {𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤,𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚,𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻ℎ}, 
𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑅𝐾𝐾,1 = {𝑈𝑈𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃,𝑂𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃,𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃}, 
𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑅𝐾𝐾,2 = {𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆,𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆,𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃}. 
(22) 
These definitions collectively satisfy the output of this step for the given example. The 
subsequent step involves parameterization of the universes of Probability, Severity, and 
Risk Level and membership functions giving mathematical description of the term sets. 
3.3.2 Calibrate Membership Functions 
 
𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅,𝑓𝑓 = �𝜇𝜇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅,𝑓𝑓,1 , 𝜇𝜇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅,𝑓𝑓,2 , … , 𝜇𝜇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅,𝑓𝑓,𝑝𝑝� ∀ 𝑓𝑓 ∈ 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹 
𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑅𝐾𝐾,𝑘𝑘 = �𝜇𝜇𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑅𝐾𝐾,𝑘𝑘,1 , 𝜇𝜇𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑅𝐾𝐾,𝑘𝑘,2 , … , 𝜇𝜇𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑅𝐾𝐾,𝑘𝑘,𝑝𝑝� ∀ 𝑅𝑅 ∈ 𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼 
(23) 
where 𝜇𝜇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅,𝑓𝑓,𝑙𝑙  and 𝜇𝜇𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑅𝐾𝐾,𝑘𝑘,𝑙𝑙 are the 𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑ℎ membership functions in their respective term sets, 
𝑃𝑃 ∈ {1, 2, … ,𝑆𝑆}. 
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It is next necessary to attune the KRIs and their consequent risk factors (which are, 
respectively, the model’s independent and dependent variables) with their fuzzy 
representations. In other words, the calibration process is one in which crisp values of the 
input variables are associated with that universe’s descriptive subsets, effectively 
converting the numerical input to a linguistic one. Membership functions encode this 
association as a degree of truth to which the associated variable is considered a member of 
the linguistic set. In this sense, articulation of the model’s parameters “requires a shift in 
knowledge representation from logical determinism and arithmetic formalism to a 
semantics and property-based representation [that is] expressed directly through the surface 
characteristics of fuzzy sets” (Cox, 492). The process of calibrating the membership 
functions determines the important fuzzy set characteristics of shape and overlap, the latter 
of which is tantamount to set ambiguity, or fuzziness. 
 While Chapter II’s discussion of membership function selection gives a 
comprehensive accounting of a concept’s characteristic shape, the horizontal method is 
employed as an experimental approach for apprising a function’s construct in the proposed 
FIS methodology for several advantageous considerations. In particular, conduct of the 
sampling largely coincides with existing operational planning processes; staff sections are 
regarded as the expert population corresponding to the subject matter for which they are 
responsible. This is not inconsistent with current practice in which the staff identifies and 
elevates risks within their functional area, albeit chiefly in qualitative fashion. Where 
quantitative measures are presently introduced, however, there exists a distinct lack of 
standardization that breeds divergent consistency in evaluation; the resulting risk 
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assessments are ultimately incommensurable and not well-suited to comprehensive course 
of action comparison. Not only does the horizontal method address this need for 
standardization, but even in its experimental simplicity it is capable of delivering “reliable 
and significant estimates” (Pedrycz, 19). 
Essentially, the method consists of surveying 𝑐𝑐 number of experts as to whether a 
given sample value, 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑑𝑑, is compatible with the term 𝑃𝑃 in universe of discourse 𝑿𝑿𝑘𝑘. This is 
posed as a question accepting only binary responses in the positive 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑑𝑑) or negative 
𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑑𝑑), from which the estimated degree of truth at value 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘 is the ratio of positive to total 
responses such that 
 𝜇𝜇𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑅𝐾𝐾,𝑘𝑘,𝑙𝑙(𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑑𝑑) =
∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑑𝑑)𝑝𝑝
∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑑𝑑) + 𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑑𝑑)𝑝𝑝
 (24) 
where 𝑅𝑅 ∈ {1, 2, 3 … ,𝑐𝑐} is the index of the responding expert, 𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝 is an optional weight 
attributing some level of authority or expertise to expert 𝑅𝑅, and the positive and negative 
variables are mutually exclusive indicators,  𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘) = 1 − 𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘) ∈ {0,1}. The survey is 
conducted over some selected number of elements 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑑𝑑 of universe 𝑿𝑿𝑘𝑘, where s signifies 
the distinct element sampled. The set of truth values so determined not only serves as the 
basis for fitting a distribution and, accordingly, the fuzzy set 𝑃𝑃’s membership function, but 
in fact defines the fuzzy set’s bounds via the result’s standard deviation, 
 �𝜇𝜇𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼,𝑅𝑅,𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅) −
�𝜇𝜇𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼,𝑅𝑅,𝑃𝑃
(𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅) �1 − 𝜇𝜇𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼,𝑅𝑅,𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅)�
∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅(𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅) + 𝑤𝑤𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅(𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅)𝑅𝑅
 ,    
(25) 
 𝜇𝜇𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼,𝑅𝑅,𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅) +
�𝜇𝜇𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼,𝑅𝑅,𝑃𝑃
(𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅) �1 − 𝜇𝜇𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼,𝑅𝑅,𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅)�
∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅(𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅) + 𝑤𝑤𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅(𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅)𝑅𝑅
� 
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To ensure commensurability of the output fuzzy sets, thereby permitting the 
combination of risk factor conclusions into a single operational risk value, it is necessary 
that the analyst define risk factors over the same universe of discourse, 𝒀𝒀𝑓𝑓. This does not, 
however, require that each risk factor share the same number or shape of subordinate 
linguistic descriptions, and each membership function, 𝜇𝜇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅,𝑓𝑓,𝑙𝑙(𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓), can be defined 
according to its conditional interpretation. However, that the RAFIS will, in fact, permit 
alternative definitions of the consequent universes. Should risk decisions demand more 
concrete considerations than an abstract risk value, it is possible that model outputs be 
instituted in the language of “mission success (which missions will and which will not be 
accomplished), time (how much longer will a mission take to achieve success), and forces 
(casualties, future readiness, etc.), and [to a lesser extent] political implications” (JP-5, V-
14). Regardless, the outcome of this process is that all term sets, 𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅,𝑓𝑓,𝑙𝑙 and 𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑅𝐾𝐾,𝑘𝑘,𝑙𝑙, are 
defined with each elemental membership function fully parameterized.  
Continuing with the example problem introduced in Section 3.3.1, the fuzzy sets 
are depicted in Figure 18; for the purpose of illustration, the assumed membership 
functions of the Probability KRI are Gaussian, Severity’s are triangular, and those of the 
Risk Factor, Risk Level, are trapezoidal. These membership function shapes are selected to 
delineate the behaviors from one another in later exposition; they are not, however, chosen 
arbitrarily but are rather representative of the ambiguity intrinsic to the linguistic concepts. 
Note also that the process of eliciting the characteristics of the membership functions 
simultaneously aids in defining the universe of discourse’s domain (such that the minimum 
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value of the qualitatively lowest fuzzy set and the maximum value of the qualitatively 
highest define the universal boundaries). 
 
Figure 18. Example Antecedent and Consequent Membership Functions. 
 
3.3.3 Specify Inference Rules 
 
𝑅𝑅1 =  If (𝑲𝑲𝑲𝑲𝑰𝑰𝟏𝟏 is 𝜇𝜇𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑅𝐾𝐾,1,1) and (𝑲𝑲𝑲𝑲𝑰𝑰𝟐𝟐 is 𝜇𝜇𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑅𝐾𝐾,2,1) then (𝑲𝑲𝑹𝑹𝟏𝟏 is 𝜇𝜇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅,1,1), 
𝑅𝑅2 =  If (𝑲𝑲𝑲𝑲𝑰𝑰𝟏𝟏 is 𝜇𝜇𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑅𝐾𝐾,1,2) and (𝑲𝑲𝑲𝑲𝑰𝑰𝟐𝟐 is 𝜇𝜇𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑅𝐾𝐾,2,2) then (𝑲𝑲𝑹𝑹𝟏𝟏 is 𝜇𝜇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅,1,2), 
𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗 =  If (𝑲𝑲𝑲𝑲𝑰𝑰𝒌𝒌 is 𝜇𝜇𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑅𝐾𝐾,𝑘𝑘,𝑙𝑙) and (𝑲𝑲𝑲𝑲𝑰𝑰𝒌𝒌′ is 𝜇𝜇𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑅𝐾𝐾,𝑘𝑘′,𝑙𝑙) then (𝑲𝑲𝑹𝑹𝒇𝒇 is 𝜇𝜇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅,𝑓𝑓,𝑙𝑙), 
and so forth… 
(26) 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗 is the 𝑗𝑗th inference rule. 
In this third compositional step of knowledge elicitation, expert knowledge is 
deconstructed and encoded into the system through development of a rule base that 
contains a series of inference rules using natural language to specify the interactions 
between KRIs and their causal relationships with the consequent Risk Factors, thereby 
“mimicking human’s reasoning capabilities to solve complex systems” (Reveiz, 24). The 
rule base therefore describes the expected behavior of the output Risk Factors given the 
input KRI variables (and, in turn, the degree to which the KRI’s term sets are satisfied). 
The rules, though linguistic, constitute the model’s mathematical processes; they encode 
the fundamental transformations executed on the input data and ultimately give shape to a 
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response surface that reacts in a predictable and contextually appropriate manner, yielding 
the model’s output data. Construction of the model’s rule base is, in terms of the JRAM, 
predominantly captured by Risk Assessment in that it formalizes the linkages between the 
hazards and their potential consequences (in consideration of the risk drivers). It is the 
actual execution of the model, however, results in the Risk Characterization answering 
“how much risk?” (JRAM, B-3).  
There exist no hard and fast procedures for the development of the rule base. In the 
previous step, the vocabulary of the model’s fuzzy sets is used to define the semantic 
properties that underlie the relationship between the functional area expert and the decision 
process. In this step, the knowledge engineer’s task is to codify the expert’s decision and 
judgement protocols in a series of inference rules that manipulate those fuzzy sets 
according to the fuzzy operators used in the propositional calculus (Cox, 493). The 
structure of the inference rules is discussed in Chapter II’s introduction to “fuzzy 
reasoning.” In general practice, however, the rule base should cover every possible 
combination of antecedent linguistic variable that contributes to the formation of some 
consequent space. Consider the first three rules of this Chapter’s ongoing example: 
 
𝑅𝑅1 = If (Probability is Unlikely) and (Severity is Negligible) 
          then (Risk is Low) 
𝑅𝑅2 = If (Probability is Occasional) or (Severity is Moderate)  
          then (Risk is Medium) 
𝑅𝑅3 = If (Probability is Frequent) or (Severity is Critical) 
          then (Risk is High) 
(27) 
While not exhaustively listing every possible combination of antecedents, the rules 
illustrate how the subject matter expert might exercise judgment in construction of the 
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logical rule base. Of course, the disjunctive case (of “or”) is clearly irregular or even 
inappropriate for the ruleset governing the interaction of Probability and Severity; expected 
risk is often calculated as the expectation (product) of these two factors. Use of the 
conjunction “and” would permit consistency within the ruleset and allow independent 
definition of all possible pairwise combinations. This example is constructed to depict the 
use of both logical connectives for the sake of exposition; inconsistency with the defined 
rule base, specifically resulting in non-monotonicity of the output surface, is 
acknowledged.  
 
Figure 19. Example Fuzzy Associative Memory (FAM). 
 
Nevertheless, a convenient and commonly used notation for recording the rule base 
is the Fuzzy Associative Memory, or FAM, which captures in tabular form the 
transformations of fuzzy sets to others (Kosko, 306). While the example’s dual-input, 
single-output formulation is intuitively recorded in a compact representation, complex risk 
decisions may, in terms of the RAFIS, require 𝑚𝑚 number of 𝑐𝑐-dimensional hypercubes, 
each dimension quantized by 𝑆𝑆. The rule base is the functional mechanic of the model 
itself; the clarity and comprehension of rules are vital to the model’s “maintainability, 
quality, and expandability” (Cox, 554). The example’s FAM in Figure 19 is derived from 
an extension of the previously listed rules; it was purposely constructed to resemble a 
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traditional risk matrix (particularly considering the axes of likelihood and consequence). 
While the divorce of fuzzy logic from probability theory bears repeating, and is not a 
required component in the model, it is not prohibited from inclusion either, and the example 
is in fact a viable implementation of the RAFIS. The example’s risk matrix will later be 
compared with its fuzzy counterpart. 
3.4 Implementation of the RAFIS and Selection of Fuzzy Operators 
The topology of the Risk Factors’ consequent space is contingent on the 
mathematical operators applied during the logical processes of composition, implication, 
aggregation, and defuzzification. While the rest of this chapter addresses each of these 
processes in sequence, several basic t-norms and t-conorms are introduced in Chapter II 
that may serve as the fuzzy operators used to perform the transformations at each stage of 
the model. The RAFIS employs a Mamdani-type fuzzy inference system, introduced in 
1975 as one of the first applications of a rule-based fuzzy logic controller and widely 
considered the most commonly adopted inference technique. The Mamdani fuzzy logic 
controller is characterized by membership functions that define the consequent spaces as 
fuzzy sets, therefore requiring a disjunctive aggregation of rules and necessitating a process 
of defuzzification to interpolate a crisp value for each output variable (Yuan, 835). 
Mamdani-types also utilize the supremum-minimum (sup-min) compositional rule of 
inference for approximate reasoning postulated by Zadeh (1975, 28). Finally, Castro (1995) 
proved that the Mamdani class of controllers are universal approximators; that is, as a fuzzy 
logic it is capable of approximating any real continuous function defined on a compact 
domain to any arbitrary accuracy. This contribution provides the theoretical foundation for 
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their application over and above qualitative justifications that exploit the inherent nature of 
their linguistic reasoning; in effect, it addresses the question of why fuzzy rule-based 
systems “have such good performance for a wide variety of practical problems” (Castro, 
629). For these reasons, the RAFIS’ Fuzzy Inference Engine utilizes the min and max 
operators for fuzzy conjunction and disjunction in composition, the min operator in 
implication, the sup operator for aggregation, and the centroid method of defuzzification. 
3.4.1 Fuzzification 
 𝜇𝜇𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑅𝐾𝐾,𝑘𝑘,𝑙𝑙(𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘),𝑅𝑅 ∈ 𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼, 𝑃𝑃 ∈ 𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗 , 𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝑅𝑅 ∀ 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘 ∈ 𝒙𝒙 (28) 
 Given the operational risk factors and their KRIs determined in the knowledge 
elicitation process, the associated input variables, 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘, are first measured or forecast per 
KRI, per risk. In the first step of the RAFIS’ logical process, known as fuzzification, the 
crisp (non-fuzzy numerical) values are mapped to the corresponding fuzzy (linguistic) sets 
as prescribed for that variable’s universe of discourse (clearly, any variable assessed 
outside the universe’s boundaries is problematic; barring extreme “Black Swan” events in 
which the paradigm must necessarily be readjusted, such a situation is indicative of an 
inadequately constructed universe of discourse and fuzzy set parameters) (Taleb, xxii). The 
mapping is accomplished by way of evaluating each membership function given the input 
metric, per element of each propositional antecedent, per logical rule. For each evaluated 
membership function, the output of this first step is the degree of truth to which the input’s 
measurement is considered to belong to the fuzzy set, effectively “fuzzifying” the formerly 
crisp input. 
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 Continuing with the chapter’s example, fuzzification occurs in each instance where 
an input metric is mapped to a fuzzy set associated with an element of a rule’s antecedent. 
Figure 20 demonstrates this application to the first premise of the second rule, (Probability 
is Occasional). This can be interpreted to mean that a value of 𝑥𝑥 = 0.7 in universe of 
discourse 𝑿𝑿 is compatible with the linguistic concept of “occasional” probability to a 
degree of 0.642; equivalently, the extent to which the probability is considered occasional. 
All inputs are likewise fuzzified over each elemental premise for each rule. 
 
Figure 20. Example Fuzzification of Input Variable. 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Mathworks (1-29). 
 
3.4.2 Composition 
 𝜇𝜇𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗(𝒙𝒙) = � 𝜇𝜇𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑅𝐾𝐾,𝑘𝑘,𝑙𝑙(𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘) ∀ 𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝑅𝑅
𝑘𝑘∈𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑅𝐾𝐾,𝑙𝑙∈𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗
  (29) 
where 𝜇𝜇𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗(𝑥𝑥) is the composite (singleton) antecedent truth value for rule 𝑗𝑗, compounded 
via conjunction, and evaluated for all rules. 
 The second component of the RAFIS’ Inference Engine, herein termed 
composition, accepts as input the already fuzzified truth degree of each rule’s individually 
evaluated premises, applies (if present; some rules may only contain a single premise) the 
fuzzy set operator that corresponds with the logical connective between those premises 
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(and, or, not), and ultimately forms a composite antecedent that yields a single fuzzy truth 
value representative of the degree to which the rule’s antecedent is comprehensively 
satisfied. Composition is conducted in parallel against the whole ruleset. The formulation 
proposes a grand intersection of the entire antecedent based on the conjunctive structure 
consistent with the FAM rule base; that is, all predicate expressions are joined by “and.” 
The preceding discussion of universal approximators establishes that any number of 
mappings meeting the criteria of t-norms (for the logical conjunction, and) and s-norms 
(for the logical disjunction, or) are sufficient to perform the mathematical operations of 
intersection and union, respectively. The most common operators for conjunctions are 
minimum and ordinary product; for disjunctions, maximum and algebraic sum. While the 
RAFIS will necessarily accept as final antecedent truth the minimum of their collective 
truths, the example demonstrates use of the maximum in the disjunctive case. 
 
Figure 21. Example Composition of Antecedents. 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Mathworks (1-30). 
 
Figure 21 builds on the example by compositing the two antecedent premises of the 
second rule, (Probability is Occasional) or (Severity is Moderate), having already been 
evaluated at 𝑥𝑥 = 0.7 and 𝑃𝑃 = 3.2. For expository purposes, the antecedent is a disjunction 
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and dictates use of a s-norm; the maximum operator is selected. Of the two degrees of truth 
for occasional probability and moderate severity, 0.642 and 0.55 respectively, the former 
achieves the maximum, and is the output value of this step. Other rules in the formulation 
are evaluated likewise, in parallel. 
3.4.3 Implication 
 𝜇𝜇𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗
′ �𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓� = 𝜇𝜇𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗(𝒙𝒙) ∧  𝜇𝜇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅,𝑓𝑓,𝑙𝑙�𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓� ∀ 𝑓𝑓 ∈ 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹, 𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝑅𝑅  (30) 
where 𝜇𝜇𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗
′ �𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓� is the partial consequent truth value of risk factor 𝑓𝑓 for rule 𝑗𝑗, evaluated 
for all risk factors in rule 𝑗𝑗, for all rules. 
The third subprocess of the RAFIS is implication of the, now composite, antecedent 
to the consequent, predicated on the specified rule. For each rule evaluated in parallel, 
implication involves the input of a single, fuzzified, independent variable and, as an output, 
modifies the fuzzy set associated with that rule’s consequent by the degree of the input 
variable. More clearly, the antecedent’s composite value specifies the level of support that 
the proposition’s consequent is true. This is accomplished in one of two ways. In the first, 
the minimum operator truncates the consequent’s fuzzy set; utilizing the representation 
theorem, this method effectively discounts the support region of the fuzzy set’s 𝛼𝛼-cut where 
𝛼𝛼 is equal to the antecedent’s composite value. Alternatively, the ordinary product operator 
may be used as a scalar of the consequent’s fuzzy set. It is also important to note that a 
weighted ruleset may be optionally implemented to mitigate the importance of individual 
rules relative to the others; weights in the interval of [0,1] are applied to the antecedent’s 
output prior to implication and are otherwise assumed to be 1 (Mathworks, 1-31). Figure 
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22 depicts the truncation achieved by the minimum operator on the (Risk is Medium) 
consequent set; specific to the example, this is 
 𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆(𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝛼𝛼=0) − 𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆(𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝛼𝛼=0.642) = {𝑧𝑧 ∈ 𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎|𝜇𝜇𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑(𝑧𝑧) < 0.642}. (31) 
 
Figure 22. Example Implication of Consequents. 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Mathworks (1-31). 
 
3.4.4 Aggregation 
 𝜇𝜇𝐶𝐶�𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓� =  �𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗
′ �𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓� ∀ 𝑓𝑓 ∈ 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹
𝑗𝑗∈𝑅𝑅
 (32) 
where 𝜇𝜇𝐶𝐶�𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓� is the consequent truth value for risk factor 𝑓𝑓 aggregated over the entire 
rule base, for all risk factors 𝑓𝑓. 
Accepting as input the truncated or scaled fuzzy set outputs of the implication 
subprocess, the fourth component of the RAFIS aggregates, or compiles, the residual 
consequents into a single fuzzy set. This output set of the aggregation, illustrated in the 
right-most column of Figure 23, is representative of the support for the consequent given 
the propositional set of all non-fuzzy inputs evaluated over all rules. In fact, the aggregate 
membership function is specific to the particular crisp inputs; alternate inputs may generate 
a distinct membership function. Mathematically, the aggregation is executed through any 
commutative operator for the logical disjunction (such that the ordinal sequence of 
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inclusion is immaterial); the maximum, ordinary sum (over all values of 𝒁𝒁), and algebraic 
sum (𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃) are all used in the literature as t-conorms to determine multi-set union. In 
the example, aggregation via maximum of the three resultant consequent fuzzy sets yields 
the membership function shown in the bottom-right panel of Figure 23. In a broad sense, 
the aggregate membership function is therefore 
 �𝜇𝜇𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙∪𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑∪ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖ℎ�(𝑧𝑧) 
(33) 
 = max�𝜇𝜇𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑧𝑧) < 0.004, 𝜇𝜇𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑(𝑧𝑧) < 0.642, 𝜇𝜇ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖ℎ(𝑧𝑧) < 0.368�. 
 
 
Figure 23. Example Inference Detail. 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Mathworks (1-36). 
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3.4.5 Defuzzification  
 𝑃𝑃�𝑓𝑓 =  
∫ 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓 𝜇𝜇𝐶𝐶�𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓�
𝑦𝑦�𝑓𝑓
𝑦𝑦�𝑓𝑓
𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓
 ∫ 𝜇𝜇𝐶𝐶�𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓� 𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓
𝑦𝑦�𝑓𝑓
𝑦𝑦�𝑓𝑓
≅
∑ 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝜇𝜇𝐶𝐶�𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝�𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝=0 
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝐶𝐶�𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝�𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝=0 
∀ 𝑓𝑓 ∈ 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹 (34) 
where 𝑃𝑃�𝑓𝑓 and 𝑃𝑃�𝑓𝑓 are the minimum and maximum bounds on the universe of discourse 𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓, 
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝 reflects the discretized points over the domain of 𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓, and 𝑃𝑃�𝑓𝑓 is the singleton composite 
moment that represents the fuzzy consequent space of risk factor 𝑓𝑓. 
The fifth and final step of the FIS is defuzzification, which is effectively the 
extrapolation of a crisp value that is representative of the aggregate fuzzy set. This single 
value is the JRAM’s Risk Characterization, and answers the question of “how much risk?” 
As stated in the prior paragraph’s explanation of aggregation, the aggregate fuzzy 
membership function is indicative of the degree of truth to which the consequent is satisfied 
for all values of 𝑧𝑧 in 𝒁𝒁 (given the specific input values, it is likely that all values of 𝑧𝑧 
correspond with some nonzero truth degree). Accordingly, it is useful to extract a non-
fuzzy value, 𝑧𝑧̅, as output from the FIS from which further quantitative analysis can be 
conducted. While textbooks like Cox (1999) provide a more comprehensive accounting of 
the various methods employed for defuzzification (centroid, bisector, mean of maxima), 
the centroid calculation is predominantly practiced. In this method, also known as the 
“center of gravity” method, an expected value is determined by weighted average of the 
area under the aggregate membership function’s curve. This value corresponds to the point 
in the z-axis which equally bifurcates the output fuzzy region by area (Reveiz, 15). Applied 
to the example in Figure 23, centroid defuzzification yields the FIS output of 𝑧𝑧̅ = 54.6 (out 
of 100), indicating the level of risk that corresponds with the specified input variables. On 
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its own, this value can be evaluated against the consequent membership functions for Risk 
Level. In this case, the value coincides with medium risk. However, the output value is 
more informative when considered in relation to evaluations utilizing alternate inputs 
variables, as would be the case in Course of Action comparisons of the JPP. 
3.4.6 Risk Factor Consolidation 
While the output aggregate risk factors, 𝑃𝑃�𝑓𝑓, may simply be summed (or weighted 
and summed) to determine a total operational risk value, it is probable that dependencies 
exist between the individual risk factors that inhibit use of a strictly summative method 
for consolidation. In such cases, a correlation matrix can be used to account for the 
dependent relationships between output variables. The correlations may be derived from 
either experience data or expert opinion. The model’s total operational risk is therefore 
defined by 
 𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅 = �(𝑃𝑃�1,𝑃𝑃�2, … ,𝑃𝑃�𝑚𝑚)�
1 𝜌𝜌12 𝜌𝜌1𝑚𝑚
𝜌𝜌21 1 𝜌𝜌2𝑚𝑚
𝜌𝜌𝑚𝑚1 𝜌𝜌𝑚𝑚2 1
��
𝑃𝑃�1
𝑃𝑃�2
𝑃𝑃�𝑚𝑚
� (35) 
where 𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅 is the total operational risk, 𝜌𝜌𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 is the correlation coefficient of risk factors 𝑅𝑅 
and 𝑗𝑗, and 𝑚𝑚 is the total number of risk factors (Shang, 36). 
3.5 Inform Decision-Making 
 Having fully assembled a knowledge base consisting of membership functions and 
their corresponding propositional rule base, and having instituted the mathematical 
framework of triangular norm mappings particular to each of the model’s subprocesses, the 
RAFIS effectively defines the feasible region of the consequent space for all possible 
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combinations of input variables. Accordingly, the relationship of the consequent to any two 
antecedent variables may be modeled as a surface. In this manner, the pairwise examination 
of two inputs and their effect on the resultant output surface may be used to both validate 
the model’s encoded expertise (by way of membership functions and inference rules) but 
also inform decision-makers of the true non-linear nature of the relationship under 
consideration. While any arbitrary risk ontology is certainly likely to consist of more than 
two KRIs, the example, consisting exclusively of probability and severity, generates a risk 
surface in that is akin to the traditional risk matrix in common use, but tailored to the 
problem and without susceptibility to the complications enumerated in Chapter II. Figure 
24’s risk surface, or ‘fuzzy risk matrix,’ intuitively increases as both probability and 
severity increase; in this case, it is evident from the gradient associated with severity that 
the risk accrues more rapidly as a result of an increase in this factor, relative to probability. 
If attempting to mitigate overall risk through application of limited resources, this insight 
may indicate a better return of investment by addressing severity over probability. An 
alternate perspective may wish to pursue system stability or robustness by targeting flat or 
gradual surface regions not adjacent to precision-sensitive high gradient slopes. 
 
Figure 24. Example Risk Surface (Fuzzy Risk Matrix). 
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 While the individual Risk Factor output variables, the consolidated Operational 
Risk value, and the visual depictions of risk through fuzzy risk matrices constitute the 
products of the RAFIS, the end result is that these products aid the decision-maker in the 
JRAM’s Risk Evaluation, answering “how much risk is OK?” The RAFIS uniquely 
provides a numerical evaluation of risk that would otherwise have been a qualitative 
exercise. It also provides an expedient and consistent means for the reevaluation of risk 
following the implementation of Risk Management’s mitigation efforts, and, through the 
integrative and informative processes of staff estimates and operation assessment, may be 
updated and utilized throughout operational execution as a supplementary process to 
assessment. 
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IV. Analysis 
“An expert is someone who knows some of the worst mistakes that can be 
made in the concerned subject, and therefore understands how to avoid 
them.”10 
 
- Werner Heisenberg 
Der Teil und das Ganze (1969, 281) 
4.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter demonstrates the use of the RAFIS through an abbreviated instance of 
a notional rotary wing tactical mission. The purpose is to examine the feasibility of building 
and evaluating a moderately-sized instantiation of the model, as well as considering its 
potential applicability to the problem of quantifying operational risk in general. Section 4.2 
discusses the model’s construction; it is principally concerned with Knowledge Elicitation 
and Problem Framing. The focus of Section 4.3 is Risk Assessment and Characterization. 
The Joint Planning Process is oriented on planning activities at the strategic and operational 
level; however, this tactical mission is examined due to the prevalence and accessibility of 
risk assessment documentation and tools employed in the management of aviation risk. 
Military aviation breeds, by its very nature, a risk-conscious and literature-prolific 
community. This documentation, coupled with the author’s experience as a Senior Army 
Aviator, serves as the knowledge base for the model’s construction. It is not the intent of 
this study to suggest the inadequacy of present aviation risk assessment tools, only to 
demonstrate use of the proposed model. 
                                                 
10 Heisenberg, Werner. (1969). Der Teil und das Ganze: Gespräche im Umkreis der Atomphysik. München: 
R. Piper & Co Verlag. English translation from the original German by the author. Heisenberg is paraphrasing 
Niels Bohr’s recounting of a debate with Philipp Frank on causality and uncertainty during the Copenhagen 
Congress (The Second International Congress for the Unity of Science; June 21-26, 1936).  
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4.2 Model Construction 
 The primary sources of information for the model’s knowledge elicitation process 
are several variants of the ‘Risk Management Worksheet’, ‘Risk Common Operating 
Picture’ (RCOP), and the ‘Electronic Risk Assessment Worksheet’ (ERAW) employed by 
Army rotary wing units over the past decade. While the actual mathematical models 
employed are suspect from a risk-theoretic sense (they are strictly additive, but with 
conditional considerations), it is possible to elicit from them several knowledge elements 
vital to construction of the RAFIS. First, they establish a taxonomy of risk activities and 
risk factor areas from which further conversation may take place. This consideration 
informs the decision to use a “5 M” contextual lens: Man, Machine, Medium 
(environment), Management, and Mission; these will serve as the model’s output Risk 
Factors. Secondly, commonalities between the worksheets reveal an accepted vocabulary, 
not singularly in linguistic terms, but also semantics; for instance, crew member experience 
is categorized based on total flight hours, but the practiced categories are not based any 
regulatory distinction. The collection of language is used to define the risks contributing to 
the respective Risk Factors, but also the (potentially fuzzy) term sets that constitute the 
membership function conventions. 
 
Figure 25. “5 M” Risk Hierarchy. 
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Figure 25 is the product of this process and decomposes the Operational Risk into 
five output Risk Factors and 15 input Key Risk Indicators. The same source material 
provides indication of ranges (universes of discourse) and numerical categories that 
comprise the KRIs. For example, the Medium (environmental) consideration of Weather 
(𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼8) is designed to account for a comprehensive number of causal phenomena; cloud 
ceiling, visibility, temperature, pressure altitude, winds, and precipitation are among these. 
Because of the high correlation of many of these phenomena, expert specification of the 
associated state variable’s value (for Weather) is necessary when resolving the model. 
Were the model to be decomposed further into independent variables, it would be possible 
to define the ceiling over a range from surface to Flight Level 180, or 18,000 feet (since 
operation in Class A airspace is necessarily conducted under Instrument Flight Rules; for 
practical purposes, ceiling might be considered irrelevant above this figure). The functional 
concern for tactical rotary aircraft is much lower in altitude, however, and there exist some 
commonly delineated categories at elevations below 500 feet Above Ground Level (AGL), 
above 500 AGL, above 700 AGL, above 1000 AGL, and above 1500 AGL. These 
correspond with decreasing degrees of risk. 
This discussion does not mean to be an exhaustive dialogue on weather or 
exclusionary to non-aviators or weathermen. Rather, it emphasizes the expert consultation 
required as input to formulate each membership function and KRI. Ceilings also serve to 
illustrate a reason as to why fuzzy thinking is arguably suitable given the already agreed 
upon crisply-delineated standards in practice. Cloud ceilings, as a weather phenomenon, 
are not temporally static; they constantly move due to winds. They might be tens of feet or 
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many thousands of feet thick, without distinction. They are not of uniform density or 
distribution; only broken or overcast conditions are considered to constitute a ceiling and 
a “measurement” of under 5/8ths of the sky results in a condition of ‘no ceiling’ (but perhaps 
infinitesimally shy of that criteria). Likewise, the different tools (ceilometers) used to 
measure cloud base (ceiling height) are subject to any number of different resolutions, 
capabilities, or calibrations. There are even mathematical formulations from which it can 
be calculated absent observation. Needless to say, a tactical mission that executes under 
assumption of one ceiling condition might actually encounter a very different scenario. 
Fuzzy logic minimizes the impact of natural variation or faulty forecast by modeling the 
surface as a continuous function, without having to account for every facet of reality or its 
measurement. 
In this particular implementation, the 15 KRIs are composed of 73 membership 
functions, each assiduously considered in the same fashion as the discussion on ceilings, 
and each possessing a unique characteristic shape, parameterization, and degree of fuzzy 
overlap. Finally, the logical rule base is built in which encodes the qualitative expert 
judgment on variable interactions. All feasible interactions need be considered; the 
appropriate number of interactions for this model requires 264 distinct risk judgements, 
recorded as a set of inductive rules, with each rule individually evaluated by the author. 
Appendix A contains the entire listing of membership functions, their parameters, and all 
logical rules. The formulation is then programmed into MATLAB. It is evident that the 
construction of large instances are demanding affairs; this model is relatively conservative 
with only 15 inputs and 5 outputs. 
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4.3 Model Evaluation and Results 
A fictional state vector, 𝑥𝑥, constituting the expected or observed numerical 
measures corresponding to the scenario’s KRIs in Figure 25, is generated as input to test 
the functionality of the model. The state vector is 
 𝑥𝑥 = (𝑥𝑥1, 𝑥𝑥2, 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘 , … , 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) 
(36) 
 = (900, 2, 18, 26, 83, 13, 19, 720, 6, 1, 50, 2.5, 12, 6, 4), 
where, by the formulation in Chapter III, 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘 is the quantified value corresponding to the 
𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑ℎ KRI. For instance, the input associated with 𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼8 is 𝑥𝑥8 = 720. The other constituent 
values are not arbitrarily chosen (although it would not be inadmissible by the model if 
they were); they represent a typical and realistic scenario reflecting appropriate crew 
selection for the particular mission and conditions. This is intended to convey interpretable 
results (non-realistic inputs are potentially interpretable, but produce either trivial or absurd 
results). Within the context of operational planning, these values would be derived from 
running estimates, wargame results, expert opinion, or actual measurement (enemy threat, 
for example, might be determined under the Intelligence Collection Plan). 
 The MATLAB model resolves a single run near-instantaneously on a Windows 10 
(x64) based system with dual E5-2680 CPUs at 2.50 GHz and 192 GB of system memory; 
the parallel nature of rule inference is suggestive of a low computational cost that grants 
risk analysts the ability to responsively apprise the model for updated state variable input 
or rapidly assess alternatives. In this regard, and despite the initial rigor of model creation, 
it is also notable that once formulated, adjusting model parameters is an equally casual 
process. While changing membership function shapes and individual inference rules are 
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relatively non-invasive, alterations to linguistic lexicon, like the addition or removal of a 
membership function altogether, demands the analyst’s strict attention as there are 
implications on the linguistic calculus of the rulebase. 
  Model output comes as crisp numerical values of degree equivalent to the number 
of Risk Factors. The response vector, 𝑃𝑃�, reflects the quantitative risk within the individual 
Risk Factor domains. The response vector corresponding to input vector 𝑥𝑥 is 
 𝑃𝑃� = (𝑃𝑃�1,𝑃𝑃�2, 𝑃𝑃�𝑓𝑓 , … , 𝑃𝑃�𝑚𝑚) = (4.09, 3.41, 3.6, 5.85, 5.86), (37) 
where 𝑃𝑃�𝑓𝑓 is the aggregate and defuzzified value corresponding to the 𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑ℎ Risk Factor as 
depicted in Figure 25. It is clear that the fifth entry, Mission Risk, is the highest Risk Factor 
with a value of 𝑃𝑃�5 = 5.86 (though, correlations, if any, should be taken into account, as 
they are in Chapter III’s method for Risk Factor consolidation). In a vacuum, these output 
values have meaning only in their relative comparison. Individually, or as an aggregate OR 
value, they might be used to compare alternative scenarios run under the same model. As 
a framework for informing risk decisions, however, the fuzzy risk matrices reflect the entire 
topology of the solution space relative to the chosen pairwise KRIs. Whereas the point 
estimates are useful for comparing alternatives, decisions that are considerate of the point 
estimate’s adjacent topology are potentially more robust. Figure 26 depicts the three fuzzy 
risk matrices for Mission Risk, since it is the most severe category. There are three possible 
pairwise comparisons between the KRIs of Threat, Complexity, and Mission Type. 
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Figure 26. Mission Fuzzy Risk Matrices. 
In observing the three Fuzzy Risk Matrices, the objective is to determine a viable 
approach for the mitigation of Mission Risk. For reference, the three input KRI values are 
12 for Threat, 6 for Complexity, and 4 for Mission Type. While the digital model allows 3-
Dimensional manipulation and rotation of the matrices, printed versions require closer 
inspection for interpretation and sound diagnoses. A useful technique is to model a cross-
sectional profile-view of the respective surfaces, achieved by evaluating the model over 
the defined range of each KRI while holding all other inputs constant. This is effectively a 
sensitivity analysis on the variable; it isolates any variability induced by interaction of 
terms. 
 
Figure 27. Mission Risk Matrix Cross-Sections. 
The cross-sections in Figure 27 correspond with Figure 26’s risk matrices for their 
respective variables. The vertical blue lines reflect the variable’s initial (current) value. 
Supposing that risk reduction for any of the factors demands a resource expenditure 
commensurate with the degree of deviation desired, then efficient mitigation is achieved 
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by following ‘steepest descent’ paths of least resistance (clearly, this is not tautologically 
true; it is highly dependent on the resource cost function). Complexity’s profile appears 
most advantageous in this regard. Furthermore, Threat and Mission Type are, by definition, 
arguably exogenous to a greater extent than Complexity. Dependent on the mission’s 
criticality, Mission may even be an immutable feature of the scenario. Regardless, these 
are semantic considerations specific to the problem, not the model, and so standard 
convention dictates that that mission Complexity be reduced to the base of the amber-
colored slope with a target value of  𝑥𝑥14 = 4, indicated by the red line. Achieving this risk 
mitigation goal reduces the outcome risk vector to 
 𝑃𝑃�∗ = �𝑃𝑃�1,𝑃𝑃�2, 𝑃𝑃�𝑓𝑓 , … , 𝑃𝑃�𝑚𝑚� = (4.09, 3.41, 3.6, 5.85, 4.14), (38) 
which correctly reflects a change in the single KRI; in practice, the combined response of 
simultaneous change to multiple KRIs should be examined. Returning to the fuzzy risk 
matrices, the Complexity–Threat interaction reinforces the decision to mitigate Complexity, 
but suggests a reduction in Threat only if it can be reduced to a value below 𝑥𝑥13 = 6, an 
unlikely prospect in the scenario. The second figure, Mission Type-Complexity, suggests 
exclusive pursuit of Complexity reduction. Lastly, the coordinates of the Mission Type-
Threat interaction indicates a stable plateau at current levels, and should not be perturbed. 
Finally, a close inspection of the three risk matrices and their cross-sections is 
indicative of some minor erraticism. Specifically, Threat’s profile should exhibit 
monotonic behavior but has a trough at approximately 𝑥𝑥13 = 17 which is also observable 
as a divot in the Complexity–Threat surface at about 𝑥𝑥13 = 17, 𝑥𝑥14 = 6. In this case, 
scrutiny of the Threat membership functions reveals the cause; underpowered degree of 
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truths are attributed to numerical Threat values in the fuzzy intersection of that variable’s 
‘moderate’ and ‘high’ sets, a problem easily resolved by parameter adjustment to increase 
the amount of overlap. Other potential deficiencies may be the result of an errantly 
prescribed risk judgement encoded into the rulebase or some unrecognized interaction of 
terms. The ability to visually inspect response surfaces eases the difficulty of model 
validation and consistency checking, especially when soliciting feedback from subject 
matter experts. In the context of the JRAM and RAFIS, the cyclical interaction with staff 
provides a natural forum for the risk manager to facilitate model refinement. However, 
fuzzy risk matrices developed for KRI interactions that are designed with non-
monotonicity, inverse relationships (negative correspondence), or are purposely and 
severely non-linear may be unintuitive or of little value for visual interpretation, even if 
semantically correct in the model’s context. 
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V.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
“Finally, the general unreliability of all information presents a special 
problem in war: all action takes places, so to speak, in a kind of twilight, 
which, like fog or moonlight, often tends to make things seem grotesque and 
larger than they really are.”  
 
- Carl Von Clausewitz 
On War (1832, 140) 
5.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter summarizes the results of the research with particular emphasis on 
Sections 5.2.1 through 5.2.4 which answer, in sequence, the Investigative Questions 
proposed in Chapter I. It also suggests a potential area for future research in Section 5.3, 
and offers a brief conclusion in Section 5.4. 
5.2 Conclusions of Research 
In 1965, Lotfi Zadeh established the fundamental concepts of fuzzy sets as an 
extension of classical set theory that permits the simultaneous membership of an object to 
diametrically exclusive sets by way of assigning a “grade of membership,” or degree of 
truth, to said object. Zadeh’s concept of fuzzy sets reconciles the real-world classes of 
objects whose membership criteria is imprecisely defined with the sharply defined criteria 
of random sets, and is therefore suggested to better align with human rationale and logic, 
“particularly in the domains of pattern recognition, communication of information, and 
abstraction” (Zadeh, 1965). A distinguishing feature of fuzzy logic is that its application 
often permits the adequate modeling of a system in which classical set and probability 
theories are otherwise insufficient. This is due to several dominant characteristics; that 
fuzzy models are robust against vague or subjectively measured data, that the inference 
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rules necessary for the manipulation of fuzzy membership functions assist in establishing 
causal relationships among misunderstood or emerging variables, and that the structure of 
those membership functions readily accept linguistic variable input. The stated objective 
of this thesis is to begin the development of a viable method for the quantitative assessment 
of military operational risk in joint planning. It is natural that military operational risk, 
encompassed by the very difficulties that fuzzy logic addresses, be modeled using such a 
methodology.  
Four investigative questions (IQ) are proposed in Chapter I in order to structure the 
direction and content of the research. They are addressed in the succeeding paragraphs.  
5.2.1 Investigative Question 1.  
“How is operational risk addressed in current joint and Service literature?” 
 While the Service literatures are antiquated in their treatments on operational risk, 
the Joint Risk Analysis presents a conceptual framework that is both more doctrinally and 
mathematically sound. In particular, it recognizes the inconsistencies present in the Service 
literature, driven by discrete categorizations, and instead provides the military risk 
practitioner with a contour graph that properly acknowledges the interaction of probability 
and consequence as an ambiguous, but continuous, function. However, it fails to suggest 
any practical means of determining the exact nature of the interaction, leaving said risk 
practitioner with only a nebulous and philosophical conception of the framework’s 
meaning or potential use. In fact, the literature writ large is reticent on the issue of 
quantitative methodologies; only in a few instances does it suggest their utility, but almost 
as abruptly dismisses them in favor qualitative assessments made in linguistic terms. In 
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this sense, each Service possesses a distinct and often conflicting vocabulary that disallows 
inter-Service commensuration. Nevertheless, the conspicuous reluctance to prescribe a 
fixed mathematical formulation for risk quantification is not inappropriate; it withholds 
calculation in recognition of the interplay of fog and friction on the battlefield. In short, 
military conflict is characterized by incomplete and unreliable knowledge, a disappointing 
prospect for models reliant on probability and experience data, as are the risk matrices 
common to the Service literature. 
5.2.2 Investigative Question 2. 
“What challenges are presented by the current doctrinal means of 
quantitative risk evaluation?” 
 Risk matrices, the dominant method for communicating and interpreting risk within 
the DoD, are, despite their apparent benefits,  rife with potential complications that proceed 
from their basic mathematical premise of expected value, instead provoking fallacy and 
misinterpretation in execution. Risk matrices are demonstrably incapable of axiomatic 
application in that they cannot simultaneously satisfy monotonicity and soundness, a 
condition equating to discriminatory impotence. They additionally suffer from the potential 
for rank reversal, range compression, and are inherently error prone. The combination of 
these factors result in poor resolution, uninformative categorization, and the suboptimal 
allocation of limited resources. In aggregate, these limitations “suggest that risk matrices 
should be used with caution, and only with careful explanations of embedded judgments” 
(Cox [2], 497). Doctrine attempts to circumvent this general unreliability by advocating for 
their use as an aid in the subjective assignment of risk level by subject matter experts, rather 
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than their utility in objective quantification. However, inattentive contextual consideration, 
especially in instances of negative probability-consequence correlation, may produce 
outright harmful results in which the ‘cure is worse than the disease.’ 
5.2.3 Investigative Question 3. 
“What are the characteristics of fuzzy logic that suggest its ability to 
reconcile quantitative risk evaluation with its inherent challenges?” 
The approximate reasoning afforded by fuzzy inference systems “facilitates the 
representation of systems for which no… reasonable mathematical models exist [and for] 
systems which exhibit very complex and nonlinear behaviors” (Cox, 494). They provide, 
in effect, what amounts to model-free function estimation in that they resolve continuous 
functions absent a priori knowledge of the mathematical input-output relationships 
involved. Instead of these mathematical functions, subject matter experts articulate 
(imprecisely) the set of rules that dictates their behavior and approximates the 
correspondence between the propositional antecedents and consequents. The semantics of 
the respective predicates is captured in the linguistic variables of fuzzy sets, thereby 
associating the input and output spaces of two causally-linked fuzzy concepts. Ultimately, 
fuzzy systems are more flexible than their probabilistic counterparts; imprecision and 
ambiguity are characteristic features of a model’s structure rather than a forced element of 
its outcome. In addition to being universal approximators, Castro (1995, 629) and Cox 
(1999, 495) suggest that the good performance of fuzzy logic control systems can be 
attributed to their: 
- utilization of linguistic information, 
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- simulation of human thinking procedure, 
- ability to capture the approximate and inexact nature of the real world, 
- reduction of contradictory solutions to a fuzzy surface, thereby reflecting 
imprecision in probabilities, 
 
- provision of intuitively expressing concepts for which probability distributions are 
unknown, 
 
- granting of mathematically sound and semantic-based modeling capability at a high 
level of abstraction. 
5.2.4 Investigative Question 4. 
“Is the proposed model, a fuzzy inference system, suitable for the 
quantification of risk within the current military planning and risk 
frameworks?” 
 To an extent, in that it addresses the dichotomy between qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies, IQ4 is answered in the affirmative. In broad terms, it resolves the 
inconsistencies present in the DoD’s flawed use of risk matrices, incorporates the 
ambiguity present in linguistic categorization, and conducts logical reasoning utilizing 
natural language of expert opinion. It capably manages the input of complex, poorly 
understood, and vaguely-defined problems. It also generates as a byproduct of inference 
‘fuzzy risk matrices’ which are the response surfaces attributed to the pairwise comparison 
of two select input variables. When the output space is defined solely by those two 
contributing variables, then the ‘fuzzy risk matrix’ is likened to a traditional risk matrix for 
its intuitive and visually tractable nature; the logic, while concealed in an explicit sense, is 
generally transparent and facilitates an understandable discussion that promotes 
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meaningful risk decisions. However, the complex interactions observed in Chapter IV’s 
model reveal an unintuitive relationship when several or more inputs contribute to 
construction of the model’s surface. 
 Incorporated as a subordinate mechanism of the JRAM, and acting in concert with 
the JPP, the RAFIS is a complementary and integrative process whose inclusion is non-
disruptive to present practices, leverages for the purpose of knowledge elicitation the 
information vectors already existent in planning doctrine, and promotes cross-staff 
synchronization in consuming risk data and driving the cyclical progression of risk 
communication and decision-making. However, a turnkey adoption of the methodology is 
problematic for two prevailing reasons. First, while conceptually intuitive, the construction 
of an initial model is a time-consuming procedure that requires the careful stewardship of 
the knowledge elicitation process as well as meticulous attention on the part of the 
knowledge engineer when specifying model parameters and inference rules. Second, the 
actual execution necessitates use of a robust program for mathematical calculation. While 
MATLAB’s Fuzzy Logic Toolbox is acceptable for modeling small- to medium-sized 
formulations, the graphical user interface is insufficient for large problems. Additionally, 
staffs may not possess the MATLAB licensing. 
5.3 Recommendations for Future Research 
Eliciting an inferential rule base sufficient for the operation of large scale models 
is a laborious process at best. Even in medium-sized executions, the ability to maintain 
consistency and confer meaning in the manual risk judgment of all pairwise combinations 
of Key Risk Indicators is a challenging prospect. Fuzzy adaptive systems are artificial 
95 
neural networks that incorporate machine learning via embedded parameter estimators to 
“adaptively infer and modify [their] fuzzy associations from representative numerical 
samples” (Kosko, 18). That is, provided training data, an adaptive fuzzy system may 
generate and refine fuzzy rule sets that not only relieves human operators of tedious 
replication but ultimately confers improved system performance. Specifically, future 
research should concentrate on the development of a Takagi-Sugeno type Adaptive Neuro-
Fuzzy Inference System (ANFIS) for risk appraisal. The foundational literature is 
Derivation of Fuzzy Control Rules from Human Operator’s Control Actions (Takagi & 
Sugeno, 1983) and ANFIS: Adaptive-Network-Based Fuzzy Inference System (Jang, 1993). 
The extension of the RAFIS to a ‘RANFIS’ may also have utility in the development of 
artificial intelligence assisted decision-making capable of leveraging the massive data 
streams generated from modern battlefields, or even in the emergence of autonomous  
systems making independent risk valuations while waging algorithmic warfare. 
5.4 Summary 
As an attempt to begin the development of a methodology for the quantitative 
assessment of operational risk, the RAFIS shows promise in confronting the known 
challenges; ambiguity is encoded as linguistic variables (fuzzy sets) whose composition is 
a continuous surface, rule-based logic addresses entangled causal relationships in a manner 
that mimics human approximate reasoning, and it produces meaningful crisp outputs and 
visual representations (fuzzy risk matrices). Most significantly, its real benefit is as an 
expert system; it recognizes the military imperative of subjective assessment by experts in 
their respective risk domains, and provides, perhaps, some fleeting insight into the coup 
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d’oeil that enables their qualitative judgments. The complexities of modern battlefields will 
only continue to compound, demanding decision support systems that are flexible, robust, 
and rapid in promoting a common understanding of emerging and dynamically evolving 
risks. While not a panacea for wholesale quantification of military operational risk, fuzzy 
logic may offer a credible alternative for informing risk decisions through its inheritance 
of the conscious, educated, and experienced thought of contributing experts. 
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Appendix A. MATLAB Fuzzy Inference System Formulation (.fis) 
This appendix presents the entire formulation of the Fuzzy Inference System as 
implemented in Chapter IV. The model was executed using MATLAB’s Fuzzy Logic 
Toolbox and consists of 15 input variables (KRIs), 5 output variables (Risk Factors), and 
264 inference rules. While the variables definitions are intuitive, the format of the inference 
rules is: 
𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑃𝑃(𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚 𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃), 𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑃𝑃(𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚 𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃) (𝑤𝑤𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻ℎ𝑃𝑃) ∶ (𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆), 
where there are 15 input columns, 5 output columns, and a connective value of (1) indicates 
the conjunctive case. In observing the rules, it is insightful to consider the sparsity of the 
array; the rules only assess the KRIs that contribute to the associated Risk Factor.  
 
 
[System] 
Name='RAFIS_FINALv1' 
Type='mamdani' 
Version=2.0 
NumInputs=15 
NumOutputs=5 
NumRules=264 
AndMethod='min' 
OrMethod='max' 
ImpMethod='min' 
AggMethod='max' 
DefuzzMethod='centroid' 
  
[Input1] 
Name='Man-Experience' 
Range=[0 2500] 
NumMFs=3 
MF1='Basic':'trapmf',[-1132 -126.9 600 1250] 
MF2='Senior':'trapmf',[600 1250 1750 2250] 
MF3='Master':'trapmf',[1750 2250 2500 3625] 
  
[Input2] 
Name='Man-Composition' 
Range=[0 3] 
NumMFs=3 
MF1='Tier-1':'trimf',[-1.2 0 1.2] 
MF2='Tier-2':'trimf',[0.3 1.5 2.7] 
MF3='Tier-3':'trimf',[1.8 3 4.2] 
[System] reflects the general framework of the FIS as a 
Mamdani-type system. It specifies the exact mathematical 
operators used for conjunction, disjunction, implication, 
aggregation, and the method of defuzzification. 
[Input1] and [Input2] are the 
first two of 15 KRIs belonging 
to the model. The naming 
convention specifies the 
associated RF (in this case, 
Man). Range reflects the 
domain of the universe of 
discourse. The number of 
constituent membership 
functions are specified, named, 
and parameterized. [Input1]’s 
are trapezoidal while [Input2]’s 
are triangular. The parameters 
represent the degree of truth at 
each vertex. 
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[Input3] 
Name='Man-Endurance' 
Range=[0 24] 
NumMFs=4 
MF1='Pumpkin':'trapmf',[-7.2 -0.8 5 8] 
MF2='Fatigued':'trimf',[6 9 12] 
MF3='Alert':'trapmf',[8 12 16 24] 
MF4='Rested':'trimf',[16 24 31.99] 
  
[Input4] 
Name='Man-Currency' 
Range=[0 90] 
NumMFs=3 
MF1='Recent':'trimf',[-36 0 36] 
MF2='Currrent':'trimf',[0 30 60] 
MF3='Uncurrent':'trapmf',[45 60 93.6 122] 
  
[Input5] 
Name='Machine-Readiness' 
Range=[0 100] 
NumMFs=3 
MF1='NMC':'trapmf',[0 0 50 75] 
MF2='PMC':'trimf',[50 75 100] 
MF3='FMC':'trimf',[75 100 140] 
  
[Input6] 
Name='Machine-Performance' 
Range=[0 20] 
NumMFs=4 
MF1='MTA<5'trimf',[-6.667 -2.22e-16 6.67] 
MF2='MTA<10'trimf',[0 6.667 13.33] 
MF3='MTA<15'trimf',[6.667 13.33 20] 
MF4='MTA<20'trimf',[13.33 20 26.67] 
  
[Input7] 
Name='Medium-Illumination' 
Range=[0 100] 
NumMFs=4 
MF1='Red':'trimf',[-33.33 0 20] 
MF2='Amber':'trimf',[0 15 30] 
MF3='Green':'trimf',[20 30 40] 
MF4='Day':'trapmf',[30 50 103.3 130] 
  
[Input8] 
Name='Medium-Weather' 
Range=[0 1500] 
NumMFs=4 
MF1='<500/1':'trimf',[-500 -7.105e-15 500] 
MF2='>500/1':'trimf',[0 500 1000] 
MF3='>700/2':'trimf',[500 750 1100] 
MF4='>1000/3':'trapmf',[900 1100 1550 1950] 
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[Input9] 
Name='Medium-Terrain' 
Range=[0 15] 
NumMFs=3 
MF1='Improved':'trimf',[-6 0 6] 
MF2='Adequate':'trimf',[1.48843484965305 7.48843484965305 
13.488434849653] 
MF3='Restricted':'trimf',[9 15 21] 
  
[Input10] 
Name='Management-Relationship' 
Range=[0 3] 
NumMFs=3 
MF1='Assigned':'trimf',[-1.2 0 1.2] 
MF2='Attached':'trimf',[0.3 1.5 2.7] 
MF3='TACON':'trimf',[1.8 3 4.2] 
  
[Input11] 
Name='Management-Planning' 
Range=[0 96] 
NumMFs=4 
MF1='Hasty':'trimf',[-32.1 -0.074 4] 
MF2='Short':'trimf',[0 12 24] 
MF3='Average':'trimf',[12 36 72] 
MF4='Deliberate':'trapmf',[48 72 99.2 124.8] 
  
[Input12] 
Name='Management-Guidance' 
Range=[0 3] 
NumMFs=3 
MF1='Specific':'trimf',[-1.2 0 1.2] 
MF2='Implied':'trimf',[0.3 1.5 2.7] 
MF3='Vague':'trimf',[1.8 3 4.2] 
  
[Input13] 
Name='Mission-Threat' 
Range=[0 24] 
NumMFs=3 
MF1='Low':'trimf',[-9.6 0 6.4] 
MF2='Moderate':'trimf',[4 11 18] 
MF3='High':'trimf',[14 24 33.6] 
  
[Input14] 
Name='Mission-Complexity' 
Range=[0 10] 
NumMFs=4 
MF1='Simple':'trimf',[-3.333 -1.11e-16 3.333] 
MF2='Routine':'trimf',[0 3.333 6.667] 
MF3='Irregular':'trimf',[3.333 6.667 10] 
MF4='Elaborate':'trimf',[6.6592898997687 9.9922898997687 
13.3222898997687] 
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[Input15] 
Name='Mission-Type' 
Range=[0 5] 
NumMFs=5 
MF1='BFC/Continuation':'trimf',[-1.25 0 1.25] 
MF2='MTF/RL-Prog':'trimf',[0 1.25 2.5] 
MF3='Air-Movement':'trimf',[1.25 2.5 3.75] 
MF4='AASLT':'trimf',[2.5 3.75 5] 
MF5='QRF/POI':'trimf',[3.75 5 6.25] 
  
[Output1] 
Name='Man' 
Range=[0 10] 
NumMFs=4 
MF1='Low':'trimf',[-3.333 0 3.333] 
MF2='Medium':'trimf',[0 3.333 6.667] 
MF3='High':'trimf',[3.333 6.667 10] 
MF4='Extreme':'trimf',[6.667 10 13.33] 
  
[Output2] 
Name='Machine' 
Range=[0 10] 
NumMFs=4 
MF1='Low':'trimf',[-3.333 0 3.333] 
MF2='Medium':'trimf',[0 3.333 6.667] 
MF3='High':'trimf',[3.333 6.667 10] 
MF4='Extreme':'trimf',[6.667 10 13.33] 
  
[Output3] 
Name='Medium' 
Range=[0 10] 
NumMFs=4 
MF1='Low':'trimf',[-3.333 0 3.333] 
MF2='Medium':'trimf',[0 3.333 6.667] 
MF3='High':'trimf',[3.333 6.667 10] 
MF4='Extreme':'trimf',[6.667 10 13.33] 
  
[Output4] 
Name='Management' 
Range=[0 10] 
NumMFs=4 
MF1='Low':'trimf',[-3.333 0 3.333] 
MF2='Medium':'trimf',[0 3.333 6.667] 
MF3='High':'trimf',[3.333 6.667 10] 
MF4='Extreme':'trimf',[6.667 10 13.33] 
  
[Output5] 
Name='Mission' 
Range=[0 10] 
NumMFs=4 
MF1='Low':'trimf',[-3.333 0 3.333] 
MF2='Medium':'trimf',[0 3.333 6.667] 
MF3='High':'trimf',[3.333 6.667 10] 
MF4='Extreme':'trimf',[6.667 10 13.33] 
[Output1] is the first of five Risk Factor 
linguistic variables belonging to the 
model. The naming convention, Man, 
indicates its association with the first 
four KRIs. Like those for the input 
variables, Range reflects the domain of 
the universe of discourse. The number 
of constituent membership functions 
(in this case, NumMFs = 4) are 
specified, named, and parameterized. 
The parameters represent the degree of 
truth at each of the triangular 
membership (‘trimf’) function’s three 
vertices. 
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[Rules] 
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 3 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
1 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 3 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
1 1 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 4 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
1 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 2 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
1 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 3 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
1 1 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 4 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
1 1 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 2 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
1 1 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 3 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
1 1 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 3 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
1 1 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 1 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
1 1 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 2 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
1 1 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 3 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
1 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 3 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
1 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 3 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
1 2 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 3 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
1 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 3 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
1 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 3 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
1 2 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 3 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
1 2 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 2 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
1 2 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 2 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
1 2 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 2 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
1 2 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 1 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
1 2 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 2 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
1 2 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 3 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
1 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 4 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
1 3 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 4 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
1 3 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 4 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
1 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 4 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
1 3 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 4 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
1 3 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 4 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
1 3 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 3 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
1 3 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 3 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
1 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 4 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
1 3 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 2 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
1 3 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 3 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
1 3 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 4 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 3 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
2 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 3 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
2 1 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 4 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
2 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 2 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
2 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 3 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
2 1 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 3 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
2 1 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 1 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
2 1 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 2 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
2 1 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 3 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
[Rules] consist of the 264 expert risk judgments that constitute the model’s 
inferential logic. In this compact notation, the first series of 15 values represent 
the 15 KRIs as the proposition’s antecedent. The next 5 values, comma delineated 
from the former, represent the model’s 5 RFs. The cardinality of each indicates 
the specific subordinate membership function called by the proposition. The 
parenthetical value (1) shows the rule weight. The final value ‘:1’ indicates the 
logical connective utilized (in this case, exclusively conjunctive). 
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2 1 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 1 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
2 1 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 1 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
2 1 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 3 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
2 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 2 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
2 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 3 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
2 2 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 3 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
2 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 2 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 3 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
2 2 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 3 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
2 2 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 1 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
2 2 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 2 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
2 2 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 2 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
2 2 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 1 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
2 2 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 1 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
2 2 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 2 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
2 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 3 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
2 3 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 3 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
2 3 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 4 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
2 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 4 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
2 3 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 4 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
2 3 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 4 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
2 3 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 3 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
2 3 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 4 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
2 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 4 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
2 3 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 2 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
2 3 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 3 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
2 3 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 4 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
3 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 2 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
3 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 2 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
3 1 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 3 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
3 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 1 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
3 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 2 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
3 1 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 3 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
3 1 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 1 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
3 1 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 2 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
3 1 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 3 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
3 1 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 1 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
3 1 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 1 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
3 1 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 2 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
3 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 3 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
3 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 2 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
3 2 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 3 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
3 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 2 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
3 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 2 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
3 2 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 3 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
3 2 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 2 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
3 2 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 2 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
3 2 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 2 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
3 2 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 1 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
3 2 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 1 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
3 2 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 2 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
3 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 3 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
3 3 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 3 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
3 3 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 4 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
3 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 3 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
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3 3 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 3 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
3 3 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 3 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
3 3 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 2 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
3 3 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 2 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 3 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
3 3 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 1 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
3 3 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 2 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
3 3 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 2 0 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 4 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 4 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 4 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 4 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 3 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 3 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 2 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 2 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 2 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 1 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 1 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 3 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 1 0 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 4 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 4 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 4 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 3 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 4 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 4 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 3 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 3 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 4 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 3 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 3 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 3 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 3 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 3 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 3 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 2 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 2 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 3 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 2 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 2 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 2 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 2 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 2 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 2 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 2 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 3 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 3 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 1 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 1 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 2 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 1 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 1 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 2 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 2 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 1 0 0 (1) : 1 
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0 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 1 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 2 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 2 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 1 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 4 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 2 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 4 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 2 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 4 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 1 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 4 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 1 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 4 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 1 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 4 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 2 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 1 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 1 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 2 0 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0, 0 0 0 2 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 0, 0 0 0 3 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 0 0 0, 0 0 0 4 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 0, 0 0 0 2 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 0 0 0, 0 0 0 2 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 0 0 0, 0 0 0 2 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 0 0 0, 0 0 0 1 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 2 0 0 0, 0 0 0 2 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 0 0 0, 0 0 0 2 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 1 0 0 0, 0 0 0 1 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 2 0 0 0, 0 0 0 1 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 3 0 0 0, 0 0 0 2 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 0, 0 0 0 2 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 0 0 0, 0 0 0 3 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 3 0 0 0, 0 0 0 4 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 0 0 0, 0 0 0 2 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 0, 0 0 0 2 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 3 0 0 0, 0 0 0 3 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 1 0 0 0, 0 0 0 2 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 2 0 0 0, 0 0 0 2 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 3 0 0 0, 0 0 0 3 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 1 0 0 0, 0 0 0 1 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 2 0 0 0, 0 0 0 2 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 3 0 0 0, 0 0 0 2 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 1 0 0 0, 0 0 0 3 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 2 0 0 0, 0 0 0 3 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 3 0 0 0, 0 0 0 4 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 1 0 0 0, 0 0 0 2 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 2 0 0 0, 0 0 0 3 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 3 0 0 0, 0 0 0 3 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 1 0 0 0, 0 0 0 2 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 2 0 0 0, 0 0 0 3 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 0 0 0, 0 0 0 3 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 1 0 0 0, 0 0 0 1 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 2 0 0 0, 0 0 0 2 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 3 0 0 0, 0 0 0 3 0 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1, 0 0 0 0 1 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2, 0 0 0 0 1 (1) : 1 
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 4, 0 0 0 0 2 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 5, 0 0 0 0 2 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1, 0 0 0 0 1 (1) : 1 
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2, 0 0 0 0 1 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3, 0 0 0 0 1 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 4, 0 0 0 0 2 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 5, 0 0 0 0 3 (1) : 1 
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 5, 0 0 0 0 3 (1) : 1 
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 2, 0 0 0 0 1 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 3, 0 0 0 0 2 (1) : 1 
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 4, 0 0 0 0 3 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 5, 0 0 0 0 3 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 1, 0 0 0 0 2 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 2, 0 0 0 0 2 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 3, 0 0 0 0 3 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 4, 0 0 0 0 3 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 5, 0 0 0 0 4 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 1, 0 0 0 0 2 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 2, 0 0 0 0 2 (1) : 1 
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 5, 0 0 0 0 4 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 1, 0 0 0 0 2 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 2, 0 0 0 0 2 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 3, 0 0 0 0 3 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 4, 0 0 0 0 3 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 5, 0 0 0 0 4 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 1, 0 0 0 0 2 (1) : 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 2, 0 0 0 0 3 (1) : 1 
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